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ABSTRACT 
 
The role of contracts in improving access to credit in the smallholder livestock sector of 
Swaziland 
 
By 
 
Tengetile Mamba 
 
Degree:  MSc Agric (Agricultural Economics) 
Department:  Agricultural Economics, Extension and Rural Development 
Supervisor:  Professor Charles Machethe 
Co-Supervisor: Dr Nadhem Mtimet (ILRI) 
 
The study investigates the role of contract farming in improving access to credit for 
smallholder cattle producers, cattle finishers and traders in Swaziland. The contracts are 
verbal or informal and involve smallholder cattle producers, cattle finishers and traders on the 
one hand and other stakeholders in the value chain on the other. The study determined (a) the 
credit access status of smallholder cattle producers, finishers and traders, and whether 
participating in contracts leads to improved access to credit; and (b) identified factors that 
determine smallholder farmers’, finishers’ and traders’ access to credit from formal financial 
institutions and those that may lead farmers to become involved in contracts with other actors 
in the value chain.  
Two sets of structured questionnaires were designed to capture the required data for farmers, 
finishers and traders. The sample size was 111: 53 cattle producers, 36 cattle finishers and 22 
cattle traders. Two logistic regression models were applied. One model was employed to 
identify factors that determine access to credit from formal financial institutions. The other 
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model was employed to identify factors that may lead farmers to become involved in 
contracts with other actors in the value chain. 
The descriptive results indicate that 36 %of cattle producers, 36 % of cattle finishers, and 
50 % of cattle traders have access to credit from financial institutions. Informal channels, 
such as friends and relatives, are the predominant lenders. The results from the logit model 
for participation in formal contracts indicate that off-farm income, better access to extension 
services, being a member of a farmers’ association, having access to assured market and 
access to marketing information are positively associated with farmers’ involvement in 
contract agreements. The logit model on formal credit access indicates that income received 
from other business activities, age of the farmer, herd size, and training in beef cattle 
production had significant effects on a farmer’s probability of having access to formal credit. 
The results further reveal that participating in contracts does not determine access to credit 
from formal financial institutions. 
The study makes recommendations for increasing farmers’ involvement in formal contract 
agreements, particularly by enhancing access to market, improvements in capacity building 
and, encouragement of collective action of farmers. In addition, their involvement might be 
improved by increasing farmers’ access to credit from formal institutions by encouraging 
beef cattle farmers to diversify, thus receiving income from other businesses, and also the 
provision of producer training (and trader training) on marketing and production activities. It 
is further concluded that participating in contracts does not lead to improved access to credit 
and also access to credit relatively decreases participating in contracts. There is need to target 
the implementation and the monitoring of credit interventions for smallholder cattle farmers 
in order to improve their access to credit and participation in contract farming. 
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CHAPTER 1  
INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Background 
Access to credit is essential for the development of the agricultural sector. The agricultural 
sector in Swaziland accounts for about 25 % of the total volume of credit from formal 
financial institutions, with commercial sugarcane farmers being the biggest recipients (CBS, 
2012). However, the commercial banks are unwilling to participate in the provision of credit 
to smallholder farmers on Swazi Nation Land (SNL), due to their lack of collateral and the 
high cost involved in its administration (as smallholders usually borrow small amounts and 
are dispersed). Currently, there are no Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) involved in 
providing credit to smallholder farmers in Swaziland (Msibi, 2009). 
Swaziland has both formal and informal financial institutions. Informal credit institutions 
have social relations with some of their borrowers and this enables the borrowers to have 
easy access to information about the informal credit institutions’ lending ability. This permits 
the credit officers to play a more direct role in enforcing repayment. The fact that collateral is 
rarely required in the informal credit sector enables it to flexibly satisfy financial needs of 
smallholders that cannot be met by the formal financial institutions. However, in the informal 
credit system, credit is disbursed without thoroughly assessing the socio-economic condition 
of the community (Masuku, 2010).  
Most of the credit aid programmes in Swaziland are supply-led and mostly attached to 
agricultural technology package programmes. Credit is provided without sufficient 
information about the community in relation to their attitude towards credit, in terms of 
repayment history (Msibi, 2009).The most active formal financial institution in servicing 
smallholders with finance is Swazi Bank, a state-owned bank. Swazi Bank has an adequate 
branch network and the capacity to provide credit to smallholder farmers. However, it is 
developing from a long reorganisation exercise that started back in 1995 and strengthening of 
its financial health is required before it can increase its lending to smallholder farmers 
(Swazibank, 2011). Other institutions include the Swaziland Industrial Development 
Company (SIDC), which is mainly engaged in the agro-industrial and industrial sectors and 
its coverage is limited in the smallholder farmer sub-sector. There is also the Swaziland 
Development Finance Corporation (FINCORP), which was established to support the rural 
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poor and to promote Swazi micro-, small-, and medium-scale enterprises. It has the mandate 
and technical capacity to engage in providing credit to smallholder farmers. Although it 
resources are limited, it has an active portfolio, mostly utilised by sugarcane smallholder 
farmers with a few loans extended to cattle farmers (FINCORP, 2012). 
Agricultural producers rely on credit resources to raise the capital needed to initiate and 
sustain their production and marketing activities. The provision of credit to rural populations 
has been considered as an essential tool for raising their incomes, mainly by mobilising 
resources to more productive uses. In developing countries like Swaziland, agricultural credit 
plays a more significant role in enhancing agricultural productivity (Mavimbela et al., 2010). 
The question is, to what extent can credit be offered to the rural poor to assist in their taking 
advantage of the emerging entrepreneurial activities? Nevertheless, having access to credit 
may be difficult if the levels of income are low for the poor. Yehuala (2008) stated that under 
such circumstances, increasing family income through taking up a loan could help the rural 
poor to accumulate their own capital and invest in employment-generating activities. 
Formal financial institutions fail to provide for the credit needs of smallholders, mainly 
owing to their lending systems. These institutions have created the myth that the poor are not 
bankable, as they are considered to be non-creditworthy because they cannot provide the 
required collateral. The majority of smallholder farmers in developing countries still have 
limited access to bank services to support their agricultural and private enterprises. This is 
despite efforts made to overcome the extensive lack of financial services and the expansion of 
credit in the rural areas of these countries (Masuku, 2010). 
Provision of credit is important for promoting rural development. Credit helps in the 
attainment of necessary inputs for the rapid and sustainable growth of agriculture. Rural 
credit can be substituted temporary for personal savings. This type of credit can boost and 
promote the process of agricultural production and productivity as the smallholder farmer is 
able to use improved agricultural technologies. The adoption of modern technologies, 
however, is relatively expensive and smallholder farmers cannot afford to finance it 
themselves. This then leads to a low utilisation rate of agricultural technologies. Some 
researchers (Diagne & Zeller, 2001; Jabbar et al., 2002) have argued that agricultural 
production and productivity would be accelerated through enhanced rural credit provision. 
Therefore, it is crucial to improve the credit status of smallholder farmers in order to increase 
agricultural production and productivity (Binswanger & Khandker, 1995). 
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Smallholder farmers’ lack of access to credit has hindered agricultural revolution and the 
speedy eradication of poverty. Uncertainties arising from the agricultural process, such as 
dependence on rainfall, poor animal husbandry practices and poor farming systems, have 
made formal lenders hesitant to provide loans to smallholders for large-scale investments to 
boost agricultural productivity. Land ownership is one of the important prerequisites for loan 
qualifications set by formal financial institutions, but this has been denied to most 
smallholder farmers (Fin Mark Trust, 2011). Smallholder cattle farmers in Swaziland are 
located in SNL, and thus do not possess land titles. 
Smallholder cattle farmers still lack essential inputs, lack access to financial markets for 
credit, lack access to irrigated land, have limited access to guaranteed markets, and are faced 
with high transaction costs, as they are located in the rural areas. Cattle production and 
marketing of beef are costly ventures and, therefore, smallholder farmers must have access to 
credit to increase production and income for their households (Vilakati, 1994). 
The subsistence nature of livestock rearing in Swaziland, generally weak investments in the 
sector and poor linkages of most farmers to formal markets and value addition chains have 
led to the low beef off-take in the country. Cattle production, and more particularly beef 
industry value addition, is of little interest to investors and the financial sector. Only a small 
number of large-scale producers with strong links to, or own, slaughterhouses, processing and 
retailing facilities have access to finance (Jabbar et al., 2002). 
 
1.2 Research problem 
In developing countries, including Swaziland, a major constraint to increasing the 
productivity of smallholder farmers is their inability to access credit from formal financial 
institutions. Despite many interventions involving supplier-led approaches to credit, limited 
success has been achieved in improving access to credit for smallholder farmers in 
Swaziland. Hence, the country is still searching for better ways to improve access to credit 
for smallholder farmers. Research has shown that improving access to formal credit will 
require a paradigm shift to a demand-driven approach (Zeller & Sharma, 1998; Meyer, 2002). 
There has been a renewal of interest in improving access to credit in Swaziland, especially for 
sugarcane and vegetable farmers (Msibi, 2009). Cattle farmers are still lagging behind, as the 
livestock sub-sector is engulfed by poor animal husbandry practices. Masuku (2010), in a 
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study of access to credit by smallholder farmers, concluded that formal financial institutions 
must improve their lending terms and conditions for small-scale agricultural initiatives as this 
would provide an important opportunity to assist smallholder farmers to have access to credit. 
Therefore, having good institutional arrangements is vital for promoting the livestock sector 
and increasing its contribution to the economy. 
In the agricultural sector contract farming is one of the alternatives for solving problems of 
lack of access to credit. Studies (e.g. Key & Runsten, 1999; Warning & Key, 2002) have 
confirmed the improvement in farmers’ access to credit as being a result of participation in 
contract farming. To participate in contract farming, farmers are affected by physical, social 
and economic factors. The benefit of contract farming depends on different aspects, such as 
type of agricultural sector, behaviour of contractors and other socio-economic factors. 
Contract farming has played a major role in improving access to credit for smallholder 
farmers, as empirical evidence from previous research has shown. As stated by Slangen et al. 
(2008), contracts have enabled farmers to gain access to a wide range of services that were 
otherwise unattainable, such as access to credit, markets, new technologies and risk 
reduction. Although contracts have the potential to improve access to credit, little research 
has been conducted in Swaziland to determine the role of contracts in enhancing access to 
credit. Results of a study by Da Silva (2005), on the growing role of contract farming in agri-
food systems development, indicated that credit is enhanced and typically supplied through 
input provision and as investment credit for the acquisition of machinery and buildings by the 
contracting firms or the banking system. The study also found that credit is enhanced through 
contractual commitment as this served as a guarantee for the granting of loans by 
agribusiness firms.  
Masuku (2011) conducted a study on the role of contracts in sugarcane farming in Swaziland, 
but did not address how participation in the contracts enhances access to credit from formal 
financial institutions for smallholder farmers. Studies on the role of contracts are few in the 
smallholder livestock sector and they focus mostly on production and marketing of products 
of smallholder farmers, rather than on livestock farmers’ access to services. They also focus 
on the impact of contract farming on household income of smallholder farmers (Catelo & 
Costales, 2014; Musara et al., 2011; Wainaina et al., 2012) rather than enhancing access to 
credit from formal financial institutions. There is also scant information on the determinants 
of participation in these contracts in the case of smallholder cattle farmers. Assessing the 
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impact of contracts on smallholders’ access to formal credit is important for the design and 
implementation of policies and strategies that aim to create sustainable markets for 
smallholder cattle farmers. 
 
1.3 Research Questions 
The research questions were: 
1. Do smallholder cattle farmers have access to formal credit from commercial banks or 
other financial institutions for their livestock activities? 
2. Does being involved in a contractual arrangement increase the probability of 
smallholder cattle producers, cattle fatteners and cattle traders gaining access to credit 
from formal financial institutions? 
3. What are the constraints faced by smallholder cattle producers, cattle fatteners and 
cattle traders when trying to access formal markets? 
4. What are the constraints faced by smallholder cattle farmers when trying to become 
freely involved in or engage in contractual arrangements? 
 
1.4 Objectives of the study 
The main objective of the study was to investigate the role of contracts in promoting access to 
credit for smallholder cattle farmers, cattle fatteners and traders in Swaziland. 
The specific objectives of the study were to: 
1. Determine the credit access status of smallholder cattle farmers, fatteners and traders. 
2. Identify factors that determine smallholder cattle farmers’, fatteners’ and traders’ 
access to credit from formal financial institutions. 
3. Determine whether participating in contracts leads to improved access to credit. 
4. Determine factors that may lead cattle farmers to become involved in contract 
agreements with other actors in the value chain. 
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1.5  Research hypothesis 
The hypothesis to be tested in this study is that, participation in contract farming will improve 
access to credit for smallholder cattle farmers, cattle finishers and cattle traders in Swaziland. 
 
1.6 Organisation of the study 
Chapter 2 provides an overview of the agricultural sector of Swaziland, livestock production, 
risks, issues affecting future success of the beef industry, and contract farming as an 
institutional arrangement for beef cattle production. Chapter 3 reviews the relevant literature 
on the role of credit in agriculture and livestock development, access to credit by 
smallholders, the role of value chain finance in the beef industry, and determinants of access 
to credit. Chapter 4 reviews the relevant literature on the role of contract farming, the costs 
and benefits, and determinants of participation in contract farming. Chapter 5 describes how 
the study was conducted by explaining the methods and procedures. Chapter 6 presents the 
socio-economic characteristics of the sample while Chapter 7 presents the results and 
discussion of the study. Chapter 8 presents the summary, conclusion, and recommendations. 
 
  
7 
 
CHAPTER 2  
AGRICULTURE AND THE LIVESTOCK SECTOR IN SWAZILAND 
2.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents an overview of the agricultural and the livestock sector in Swaziland, 
including its productivity. The chapter further presents a review of literature on risk in the 
beef industry, issues affecting future success of the beef industry, and contract farming as an 
institutional arrangement for the beef industry. 
 
2.2 The agricultural sector 
2.2.1 Contribution to the economy 
The economy of Swaziland is largely dependent on agriculture. The agricultural sector 
employs 70 % of the population and contributes 7.8 % of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 
(MOA, 2013). The share of agricultural GDP has, however, been declining in recent years. 
The share of agriculture fell from 13.9 % in 2003 to 7.8 % in 2012 (CBS, 2012). Despite the 
decline in agriculture’s share, the sector remains the key sector in Swaziland’s economy. 
Since Swaziland heavily relies on agriculture, this renders her economic growth vulnerable to 
climatic shocks. This is shown by the real per capita GDP growth which fell from 6 % in 
1990 to a negative rate of 1.5 % as of 2012, mainly attributable to a severe drought 
experienced in the country (MOA, 2013). 
 
2.2.2 Land ownership types in Swaziland 
There are two major types of land ownership in Swaziland: Swazi Nation Land (SNL) and 
Title Deed Land (TDL). SNL is communal and is held in trust for the nation by the King 
through Chiefs who allocate usufruct rights to individual Swazi families. Agriculture 
conducted on the SNL is basically subsistence in nature and about 75 % of the population is 
employed in subsistence agriculture. SNL suffers from low productivity and investment. That 
is why efforts are being made to encourage SNL farmers to produce commercially. Most 
Swazi families grow subsistence crops, mainly maize, and cotton as cash crops and about 
65 % also own cattle (Vilakati, 1994). 
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TDL includes land used by commercial farms, estates and ranches that are freehold or held 
under concession agreements. Agriculture on TDL is mainly commercial with high levels of 
investment in productivity and irrigation. On TDL there are large sugarcane and citrus 
estates, forestry and other investments on individual tenure farms (ITFs) which generate 
foreign exchange earnings. Agriculture on TDL also includes beef and poultry production, 
dairy farming, and fruit and vegetable growing for mostly local consumption (Masuku, 
2010). 
 
2.2.3 Agricultural production 
Swaziland has a number of commercially produced agricultural products which include, but 
are not limited to, sugarcane, cotton, tobacco, pineapples, corn, rice, citrus, sorghum, peanuts, 
cattle, goats, and sheep. The status of agricultural GDP (AgGDP), as shown in Figure 2.1, is 
led by crops in TDL and livestock is lagging behind. It must be noted that livestock includes 
goats and sheep, and not only beef and dairy cattle. Of the total AgGDP, forestry, livestock, 
crops (SNL), and crops (TDL) contribute 6 %, 7 %, 9 %, and 78 %, respectively (MOA, 
2013). From these figures, it can be deduced that crops on TDL generate more than two-
thirds of AgGDP because of commercialisation and this sub-sector relies heavily on irrigation 
and improved technologies for production. The 7 % of livestock contribution to the AgGDP 
is mostly from the TDL where there is irrigation and genetic improvements. For this reason, 
the commercialisation of the livestock sub-sector mostly in the SNL is being encouraged, as 
well as the use of improved technologies for genetic improvement, in order to obtain an 
increase in production and marketing of cattle (Government of Swaziland, 2007). 
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Figure ‎2.1: Agricultural GDP 
Source: MOA (2013) 
 
The agricultural sector is important to any developing country, as it provides employment and 
represents an important source of foreign exchange earnings, and, given its importance to the 
national economy, almost all governments give high priority to raising agricultural 
productivity, and hence farmers’ income. Farmers, mostly from SNL, heavily rely on rainfall 
since access to irrigation is limited. This led the GOS, the International Fund for Agricultural 
Development (IFAD), and the Swaziland Water and Development Enterprise (SWADE) to 
establish the Lower Usuthu Smallholder Irrigation Project (LUSIP) and the Komati 
Downstream Development Project (KDDP), a water resource for small-scale irrigation that is 
exclusively used by small farmers. These projects are situated in the lower and upper 
Lowveld where the majority of the population is poor and the area receives low rainfall. 
 
2.2.4 Agricultural exports and imports 
The organizations which enable trade in Swaziland are the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), Southern African Developing Community (SADC) and Southern African Customs 
Union (SACU). Swaziland has experienced both a balance of trade surplus and a balance of 
payment surplus in recent years (CBS, 2012). 
The major exportable commodities of the country are sugar, cotton, and wood pulp, which 
are exported to the United States (US), the European Union (EU) and South Africa. As of 
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2012, exports amounted to $1.581 billion. The economy of Swaziland is closely linked to the 
South African economy. Swaziland receives more than 80 % of its imports and sends about 
70 % of its exports to South Africa. The most important commodities which are imported in 
Swaziland are food, fuel, energy, motor vehicles and capital goods. Its import partners are 
Japan, Singapore, Mozambique, Botswana, Namibia and South Africa. In 2012, the total 
value of imports in the country amounted to $1.356 billion, and the total value of exports was 
$1.581 billion. This shows a trade surplus of $225 million. 
The contribution of the agricultural sector to total exports is shown in Figure 2.2. Agricultural 
exports' contribution to total exports is more than a third, while agricultural imports constitute 
11.5 % of total imports. However, the contribution of the livestock sector (7 %) to 
agricultural output is quite insignificant, taking into account that more than 65 % of the Swazi 
population owns livestock (cattle), with 81 % being owned by farmers on SNL (Fin Mark 
Trust, 2011). 
 
Figure ‎2.2: Imports and exports in Swaziland 
Source: CBS (2012) 
 
In the livestock sector, mostly beef cattle are exported. Table 2.1 shows a summary of beef 
exports from 2008 to 2012 in metric tonnes, together with the value contributed each year by 
the exports. Although the exports and value of exports are increasing, there is still room for 
improvement, as the quota allocated by the EU (3360 metric tonnes per annum) to the 
country has not been met. This is shown in Table 2.1, where beef exports stood at 1402 
metric tonnes by 2012. 
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Table ‎2.1: Beef exports in Swaziland 
Export 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 
Exports (metric tonnes) 1 169 1 238 1 400 1 339 1 402 
Value of Exports (E’000) 52 464 50 338 62 178 70 637 85 888 
Source: CBS (2012) 
 
2.3 Livestock sector 
2.3.1 Size and composition 
The livestock industry consists of cattle, poultry, goats, sheep and pigs among the commonly 
domesticated animals. In 2013, the cattle population (Figure 2.3) accounted for a larger 
component of the country’s livestock, that is, 633 954 herd of cattle, with goats at 485 826; 
sheep at 17 294, poultry at 4 041 764, and pigs at 43 548 (MOA, 2013). From Figure 2.3, it 
can be observed that Swaziland’s national herd has stagnated at about 600 000 herd, 
corresponding to the country’s carrying capacity. Livestock production is a major agricultural 
activity and cattle comprise the main investment asset for many Swazi households. 
 
Figure ‎2.3: Cattle population in Swaziland 
Source: MOA (2013) 
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2.3.2 Commercialisation of smallholder livestock farming 
Unless forced by economic or climatic conditions farmers, mostly those on SNL are 
unwilling to sell good quality cattle. This has caused serious problems of overgrazing and soil 
erosion and the traditional belief that cattle represent wealth has hampered beef production. 
Many of the cattle are grazed on communal SNL and there is no individual incentive to 
preserve pastures and avoid overgrazing. Swaziland has one of the highest density grazing 
rates in Africa, one beast to each 1.6 hectares (Vilakati, 1994). The GOS initiated a 
government policy to commercialise the national herd, this was supported by Swaziland Meat 
Industries (SMI) which runs the EU-standard abattoir exporting beef to the EU market. 
Further, farmers do not sell their cattle as they claim that SMI and other livestock agents offer 
low prices for their cattle in proportion to their livestock production (Table 2.2). 
Table ‎2.2: Average nominal cattle prices from auction sales for 2006-2012 period (E/Kg) 
 Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul Aug Sept Oct Nov Dec 
2006 6.71 6.04 6.10 6.31 7.40 6.84 6.99 6.00 7.78 10.13 11.84 9.00 
2007 7.36 7.10 7.20 7.09 7.30 7.95 7.83 7.50 8.43 9.97 11.47 8.37 
2008 8.37 8.45 8.11 7.83 9.50 7.44 8.79 9.05 8.52 9.41 13.78 14.61 
2009 10.87 9.08 10.00 8.23 8.12 7.43 11.20 11.3 10.80 10.50 10.00 9.50 
2010 8.90 7.62 8.88 8.62 8.76 9.28 9.54 9.71 9.87 10.10 10.23 10.35 
2011 9.89 9.53 9.76 10.65 9.20 10.38 11.80 11.81 11.7 11.00 11.40 10.63 
2012 10.80 11.11 9.64 10.62 10.70 10.40 9.98 9.87 9.87 9.97 10.20 10.67 
Source: MOA (2013) 
*The prices quoted are nominal prices in Emalangeni
1
 
 
Table 2.2 indicates the average prices per kilogram of live cattle sold on auction sales, mostly 
held at government ranches. It can be observed that cattle prices are inconsistent, varying 
from month to month, and from year to year. This is the benchmark that is usually used by 
cattle agents or traders when purchasing live cattle from farmers.  
The livestock and poultry industry is broadly divided into small-scale and large-scale 
production. Small-scale animal keeping is practised by small-scale farmers and households 
on SNL and this group is reported to own about 77 % of the total cattle population. Large-
scale livestock and poultry activities are carried out by some government farms, corporate 
                                                 
1
 1USD is equivalent to 11 emalangeni, October 2014.  
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organisations and private individuals, mainly on TDL. Small-scale farmers own between 1 
and 150 cattle, while on commercial farms, the herd size could be up to 1 500 head of cattle 
(MOA, 2013). 
The sector, therefore, provides employment and foreign exchange earnings for the country. 
Employment and income to farmers is provided through the Livestock Development Policy 
which encourages farmers to go beyond rearing livestock and move on to the meat processing 
level, where more revenue is received. The objectives of the policy includes but not limited to 
improving the national herd and animal health, nutrition, meat hygiene standards, processing 
industries, marketing, commercialisation and promotion of entrepreneurship, range 
management, legislation, and communication. 
In Swaziland, cattle farmers receive best services from the government. There were 532 
public dip tanks in 2013distributed throughout the regions of the country (MOA, 2013). All 
SNL farmers are required to send their cattle and goats to the dip tank for tick control. Cattle 
are dipped once every week in summer, and once every second week in winter. The 
veterinary assistants keep records of all cattle in each dip tank and note deaths and slaughter 
information. Specimens are taken from dead animals to the central veterinary laboratory in 
Manzini to monitor incidences of infectious diseases. This encourages many farmers to raise 
cattle (Dlamini, 2000). 
 
2.3.3 Risks in the beef cattle industry 
Every industry has its own set of risks and rewards. The beef industry is no exception. Risk 
could be explained as being the possibility that an event will occur with a negative impact on 
the successful functioning of the overall value chain and/or farms objective performance 
(Jaffee et al., 2010). There are different types of risks that affect the beef value chain, such as 
weather-related risks, natural disasters, biological and environmental risks, market-related 
risk, and logistical and infrastructural risks. In addition, there are classes of risks, that is, 
idiosyncratic risks and covariate risks (Jaffee et al., 2010). Many countries’ governments 
have injected significant amounts of money which is invested in research and development, 
but there are no guarantees that the genetic improvements that they develop would contribute 
to the beef industry’s profitability. 
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Risks can impact on the reliability, cost and efficiency of production, processing, and 
marketing activities or, in other words, the whole beef value chain. Weather-related risks, 
such as those related to hail, strong wind, high humidity and excess rain, lead to diseases 
which affect the quality of product and disrupt the flow of goods and services. These risks 
mostly affect cattle and forage producers in the first segments of the beef industry value 
chain, directly and indirectly. A harsh winter might not only end the lives of many herds of 
cattle, but it might also affect the production of grain that could make it difficult or expensive 
to continue to feed the cattle (Katz & Boland, 2000). In Swaziland, for example, in August 
2012, 10 000 herd of cattle died due to cold and wet weather, coupled with overgrazing and 
poor animal husbandry (IRIN, 2012). 
Risks related to natural disasters are floods, drought, hurricanes and earthquakes. These kinds 
of risks are classified under covariate risks because they affect many enterprises 
simultaneously. Katz and Boland (2000) gave an example in their case study of US beef 
where cattle producers in the commercial cow–calf segment initially begin grazing their cattle 
in fields and, if there is drought in the area, this can make it difficult to provide enough 
nourishment for the livestock. Once the cattle reach 320–370 kilograms, the producers begin 
to fatten their herds. They change their feeding practices and begin to feed the cattle grains 
such as corn, wheat, sorghum or barley. This practice may result in higher feed costs because 
of the higher costs of inputs comprising the cattle feed. 
Market-related risks are attributable to changes in supply and/or demand that impact on 
domestic and/or international prices of inputs. These types of risks affect the segment dealing 
with cattle production. If the demand for cattle is high, buyers will be willing to pay a higher 
price. Due to market variations, the price per kilogram of beef can fluctuate anywhere from 
$0.60 to $1.00 for grain-fed live cattle ready for slaughter (Katz & Boland, 2000; Jaffee et 
al., 2010). The packing segment of the beef industry also faces some important risks. Since 
beef slaughtering is labour intensive, an increase in labour rates or decrease in labour 
availability might prove to be costly to the segment. A country like Swaziland, which has an 
annual quota to export beef and beef products to EU countries, might be affected by exchange 
rate risk. 
Biological and environmental risks are attributable to crop and livestock pests and diseases, 
contamination, and degradation of production and produce. Finally, there are logistical and 
infrastructural risks attributable to changes in communication (Jaffee et al., 2010). These 
15 
 
risks might affect transparency and information flow in the beef value chain among actors 
which might lead to a distorting of the whole beef value chain (Leat et al., 2004). 
According to Barnes and Barnes and Associates (2004), there is less control of risk in the 
livestock value chain.  This is because business activities are shared and more time is spent in 
making decisions since more people are involved. There is less flexibility and independence. 
This then directly impacts on individual operations and sharing of proprietary information or 
expertise. Finally more money is spent to achieve a well-functioning value chain. 
 
2.3.4 The beef industry: issues affecting future success 
There are many factors that affect the future success of the beef industry, such as 
globalisation, differentiation, environmental factors and changes in diet patterns (Katz & 
Boland, 2000). Consumers all over the world are changing their consumption patterns for 
different reasons. The beef industry is highly competitive and characterised by small margins. 
The primary competition comes from local producers of fresh beef products and other protein 
products. Competition exists both in the purchase of live cattle, as well as in the sale of beef 
products. The main competitive element, in both buying and selling, is price. 
 
a) Globalisation 
The global beef market has a significant impact on the US and EU markets. As domestic per 
capita consumption decreases, the industry shifts towards international markets for future 
increases. This foreign market has high growth potential for premium beef. This has given 
many opportunities to the cattle industry, not only for large members but for smaller 
operations too, such as Swaziland. In competing for the global dollar, many smaller 
producers, suppliers and feeders will invest together to realise more profit through global 
ventures. This realisation will increase customer loyalty, broaden the customer base, and 
expand profits for these smaller operations (Katz & Boland, 2000). 
b) Environmental regulation 
The US and EU beef industries may be facing higher environmental standards in the near 
future (World Bank, 2011), and this will have a negative impact on Swaziland’s beef 
industry, as the country exports beef to the EU market. Livestock farmers must become more 
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environmentally regulated, particularly with regard to water purity, manure removal and dead 
carcass disposal. Currently, the beef industry operations are subject to inspection and 
regulation by the country’s veterinary department. They randomly inspect live animals and 
carcasses. Outbreaks of Foot and Mouth Diseases (FMD) have ruled out many African 
countries for exporting beef, but Swaziland was cleared of FMD in 2010 (SMI, 2011). 
c) Information flow 
Most of the higher costs in the beef industry come from lack of coordination between levels 
of the value chain and the poor information flow to and from the consumer. Producers can 
help reduce costs by strengthening their relationships with suppliers, buyers, and customers. 
By transferring information on consumer preferences back to the producer, a more desirable 
beef product can be produced. By forming cooperative alliances, producers can play a 
strategic part in improving the efficiency of the beef value chain and better prepare for the 
future (Katz & Boland, 2000; Schroeder, 2003). 
Figure ‎2.4: Information, product, and financial flows in beef industry 
Source: Adapted from Schroeder (2003) 
Key:                 Financial Flow Production Flow Information Flow 
 
Figure 2.4 illustrates product and money flow in the beef production and marketing system, 
with information being the critical factor determining efficiency. Without transparent and 
detailed information flow, improvements at each segment are nearly impossible to achieve 
and the value chain fails to send appropriate information to actors (Schroeder, 2003). 
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d) Low-cost production 
Another major factor for success in the beef industry is having a low-cost source of feed. 
Grain is a major input in the production of beef. Increases in the cost of grain will have a 
negative impact on the ability of beef to compete with other lower-cost sources of protein 
(Katz & Boland, 2000; Schroeder, 2003).  
 
2.3.5 Contract farming as an institutional arrangement for the beef industry 
Contract farming is one of the institutional arrangements that may help to solve farming 
problems of smallholders (Bijman, 2008). In the Swaziland livestock sector, only broiler 
chicken production is operated under formal contract farming (Masuku, 2011). Crops 
produced under formal contract farming are sugarcane, citrus fruits, pineapples and 
vegetables. 
Although smallholder livestock producers perceive the benefits and advantages in engaging 
in formal contract production, the reason for not being engaged in these contracts usually 
cited by smallholder livestock producers points to their perceptions of the non-existence of 
formal contracts in the livestock production sub-sectors, that is, beef, pork and goat 
production. If the contractual opportunities existed, certain households and farm 
characteristics would render them as not being qualified to be chosen, among which is the 
small-scale nature of beef production in the country (Bijman, 2008). 
Contract farming provides credit, improved technologies, inputs and a secured market outlet 
for smallholder farmers. In this regard, some of the problems in the beef sector could be 
solved through this institutional arrangement. The pricing system, enforcement and 
conclusion of contracts differ, depending on the contracting company concerned and other 
conditions (Hudson, 2000). 
Futures and forward contracts are sales agreements between two parties to buy/sell an asset at 
a set price and at a specific point of time in the future. Forward contracts allow price hedging 
of risk and can also be used as collateral for obtaining credit (Miller & Jones, 2010). While 
futures contracts are standardised in order to be traded on futures exchanges and further 
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provide price hedging, this allows trade companies to offset price risk of forward acquisitions 
with the counter-balancing of futures sales. 
In the beef industry, contracts govern the terms for a promised transaction, such as date of 
delivery, the expected price of cattle, and other specifications. Contracts enable farmers to 
shift some financial risk to buyers, mitigate widely fluctuating price swings, and guarantee 
markets for their livestock. In return, buyers gain a reliable and uniform supply of beef cattle. 
Consumers also benefit through lower prices of meat and meat products, consistently higher 
quality, and a wider range of convenient beef products (European Commission, 2007). 
The concept of New Institutional Economics (NIE) is increasingly used to determine the best 
agreement/contract for developing countries’ producers in highly uncertain business 
environments with opportunistic behaviour of actors involved and weak (institutional) 
enforcement systems (Ruben et al., 2007). Contracts are expected to reduce moral hazard 
problems through centralised decisions about input factors (such as feed, genetics and 
veterinary services) and production standards. The problem of adverse selection in the case of 
unobservable quality characteristics is decreased by contract systems with inherent 
monitoring approaches (Schulz et al., 2006). 
 
2.4 Summary 
The chapter has presented an overview of the agricultural and the livestock sector in 
Swaziland. A review of literature on the risk in the beef cattle industry, issues affecting future 
success of the beef cattle industry, and contract farming as an institutional arrangement for 
the beef cattle industry was presented. Contracts reduce (price) risks and safeguard specific 
investments. In order for contracts to work, smallholder farmers should not be excluded from 
contractual relations. Contracts will enable farmers to gain market access, achieve better price 
security, and secure the availability of capital or inputs. Nevertheless, farmers should not be 
forced into contractual arrangements, as this might lead to inefficiencies. 
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CHAPTER 3  
ROLE OF CREDIT IN AGRICULTURAL DEVELOPMENT, ITS ACCESS 
ANDDETERMINANTS 
3.1 Introduction 
The main objective of the study is to investigate the role of contracts in promoting access to 
credit for smallholder cattle farmers, cattle fatteners and traders in Swaziland. In order to 
analyse the promotion of credit access through the role played by contracts, international 
experience on the role of credit in agricultural development and access to credit by livestock 
farmers is reviewed. The chapter also presents a review of literature on access to credit by 
smallholder farmers in Swaziland and the determinants of access to credit by smallholder 
farmers in developing countries. 
 
3.2 The role of credit in agricultural development 
The availability of adequate rural credit is essential to an improved economic climate for 
economic growth and poverty alleviation (Zeller & Sharma, 1998). In a developing country 
context, credit is a significant tool for improving the welfare of the poor through consumption 
smoothing, as well as for improving their productive capacity through financing investment 
in physical and human capital (Binswanger & Khandker, 1995). The high demand for credit 
for productive investments usually comes from the poor who are less risk-averse and the 
credit enables them to overcome liquidity constraints, making it possible to undertake 
investment that might boost production, employment and income. This type of credit is 
normally provided by formal financial institutions. Informal financial institutions usually 
provide credit for consumption purposes, which can have a long-term positive impact on 
household productivity, allowing acquisition of skills or improvement in health status, if such 
loans are used for education or health care. These may enhance the productivity of the labour 
force. The credit market is also, at least theoretically, an important instrument for 
consumption smoothing. 
According to Shetty (2008), seed capital, even in very small amounts of cash, is important for 
buying seeds and/or fertiliser, starting a small chicken farm, for buying cattle and 
implements, or for starting up a small grocery store or carpentry shop (as an alternative 
20 
 
livelihood option), and this will enable the rural poor to emerge out of poverty. Strategies to 
ensure the provision of low interest (or interest free) loans are essential for rural people 
and/or smallholder farmers to break out of the cycle of poverty. Credit is the backbone for 
any business, and more so for agriculture which has traditionally been a non-monetary 
activity for the rural population. Agricultural credit is an integral part of the process of 
modernisation of agriculture and commercialisation of the rural economy (Masuku, 2010). 
The introduction of easy and cheap credit is the quickest way for boosting agricultural 
production. 
Agriculture has a greater need for credit than other sectors of the economy. This is because of 
the seasonal variations in the farmers' returns and a changing trend from subsistence to 
commercial farming. The importance of credit availability can be seen by the fact that mean 
input expenditures per hectare are significantly higher for farmers with credit, regardless of 
their level of assets. Higher input expenditures are presumably associated with higher 
productivity growth. For instance, the impact of institutional credit on agricultural production 
in Pakistan has been found to be positive and significant (Abedullah et al., 2009). 
According to Ali (2007), agricultural production and productivity in most developing 
countries are known to be achieved by adequate funds and credit facilities. If agricultural 
production in many of these countries were to be organised under a virtuous cycle of high 
income, high savings and consequent high capital formation and non-dependence on 
government assistance, then great agricultural productivity and investment could be achieved. 
Credit also enables a majority of farmers to access the requisite finance necessary to increase 
their farm holdings and modernise their production methods. Ali (2007) further argued that 
farmers’ access to adequate finance will allow them to adopt new production methods that 
might readily generate higher income. 
According to Diagne and Zeller (2001), credit and savings facilities can help poor rural 
households manage and often augment their otherwise limited resources and acquire adequate 
food and other basic necessities for their families. Credit facilities enable them to tap 
financial resources beyond their own and take advantage of potentially profitable investment 
opportunities. Diagne and Zeller (2001) further stated that credit and savings facilities enable 
farmers to invest in land improvements and agricultural technology, such as high-yielding 
seeds and mineral fertilisers, that increase incomes (while sustaining the natural resource 
base). For rural households who do not own land, credit and savings facilities can help 
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establish or expand family enterprises, potentially making the difference between the never-
ending poverty and an economically secure life. 
The most important objective for rural finance, according to Zeller and Sharma (1998), is to 
facilitate farmers’ access to inputs and improved technology and thereby accelerate 
agricultural productivity growth. This is shown by the factors that determine agriculture 
productivity growth, such as availability of irrigation, access to inputs, prices for outputs, 
information on new technologies and markets, incentive structures embedded in the land 
tenure system, farmers’ educational levels, and rural infrastructure. When credit is easily 
available, farmers switch quickly to new technologies and achieve rapid productivity growth. 
However, a number of features may affect farmers’ access to credit, such as small farm size 
and tenancy arrangements that result in poor collateral status. 
Additionally, Zeller and Sharma (1998) stated that credit may offer low returns to investment 
for households that own tiny plots of unirrigated land of low productivity, especially when 
they are illiterate, in ill health or lacking experience in high-yielding agro-technology and/or 
non-farm microenterprises. For these reasons, institutions such as Freedom from Hunger in 
Ghana, BRAC, and the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh, offer financial services in combination 
with other complementary services, such as basic literacy programmes, training in enterprise 
management, and education in nutrition, health, and family planning, that are likely to 
increase the productivity of the loans provided. 
Agricultural credit plays an important role in enhancing agricultural productivity in 
developing countries like Swaziland. According to Mohamed (2003), agricultural growth 
depends on increased use of agricultural inputs, technological change and technical 
efficiency. Mohamed argued that technological change is the result of research and 
development efforts, while technical efficiency with which new technology is adopted and 
used more rationally is affected by the flow of information, better infrastructure, and 
availability of funds and farmers’ managerial capabilities. The optimal use of inputs requires 
funds at the disposal of farmers. 
These funds could come either from farmers’ own savings or through borrowings. In less 
developed countries like Swaziland, where savings are negligible especially among the 
smallholder farmers, agricultural credit becomes an essential input along with modern 
technology for higher productivity. The credit needs of the farming sector have increased 
rapidly over the past few decades, resulting from the rise in use of fertiliser, improved seeds 
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and mechanisation and hike in their prices. Wetengere and Kihongo (2012) observed that 
institutional credit also affects agricultural output through financing of capital investment. 
They found that the responsiveness of agricultural output is larger to institutional credit than 
that of output to fertiliser. 
Zeller and Sharma (1998) argued that the provision of financial services is a potent tool for 
poverty alleviation; therefore, developing countries’ government should augment the delivery 
of such services to the rural poor. If an additional dollar spent on a credit-based programme 
reduces poverty by a greater amount than a dollar spent on another poverty reduction 
programme, then there is a case for redirecting resources to rural financing programmes. 
In Swaziland, the income of rural people arises from farming and allied activities, and about 
66 % of the population is unable to meet basic food needs, while 43 % live in chronic poverty 
(FAO, 2014). In 2007, Swaziland experienced one of its worst droughts which led to major 
food insecurity (FAO, 2014). Most of the people who live on SNL cultivate maize, keep 
cattle (leading to overgrazing which has caused soil depletion), occasionally produce a cash 
crop, and are illiterate. 
Smallholder farmers living on SNL face a number of obstacles that prevent them from 
breaking out of poverty. The low agricultural productivity of the land can be attributed to a 
number of factors including difficulty in accessing roads, poor linkages to markets, limited 
availability of irrigation water, vulnerability to climatic changes, and more importantly, lack 
of access to credit. Therefore, it seems reasonable to argue that any strategy to improve 
incomes should include improving access to credit for smallholder farmers, as well as the 
commercialisation of cattle production among smallholder farmers who own cattle, thus 
reducing problems of income and overgrazing. To ensure that appropriate strategies are 
designed for improving access to finance, it is important to understand why smallholder 
farmers lack access to credit for farming purposes. 
 
3.3 Access to credit by smallholder farmers in Swaziland 
The dominant prevailing perception in Swaziland is that banks are not keen to extend credit 
to smallholder farmers. This stems mainly from the fact that smallholder farmers are 
considered high-risk, and they are usually unable to provide acceptable collateral to meet 
bank lending requirements. Furthermore, banks consider loans to farmers as being too costly 
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to administer. These loans are normally small and do not justify the administrative and 
transaction costs involved (Msibi, 2009; Mavimbela et al., 2010). 
Smallholder farmers are left in the hands of state-owned Development Finance Institutions 
(DFIs) and microfinance institutions. Agricultural financing is largely provided by three 
DFIs, namely, Swazi Bank, SIDC and FINCORP. Other players in agricultural financing are 
microfinance institutions which provide funding to farmers in rural areas.  They include the 
Inhlanyelo Fund, which is a social responsibility rural financing programme sponsored by the 
Standard Bank of Swaziland, the World Vision Microfinance programme, operating in 
poverty-stricken areas, and cooperative societies (Msibi, 2009). 
There are four commercial banks (three are South African subsidiaries) and one building 
society which are operational in Swaziland. The commercial banks are First National Bank 
Swaziland, Nedbank Swaziland, Standard Bank Swaziland, and Swazibank.
2
 Commercial 
bank lending is dominated by short-term loans to the agri-processing sector, principally the 
sugar industry. The Swaziland Building Society is the country’s major provider of long-term 
mortgage lending on TDL properties, and it recently started lending on SNL properties. There 
are also 265 Non-Banking Institutions (NBIs) and 56 savings and credit cooperatives 
(SCCOs) (SACU-Kingdom of Swaziland, 2009). 
One commercial bank, Nedbank Swaziland, has in recent times ‘broken’ the traditional 
barriers between farmers and commercial banks by joining the financing of commercial 
agricultural activities in rural societies living in SNL, although mostly sugarcane and large-
scale farmers (CBS, 2012). 
In a study conducted by Masuku (2010) on access to credit by smallholder farmers in 
Swaziland, the results indicated that among the formal sources of credit, most (58 %) of the 
respondents sourced credit from Swazibank, and a modest number (17 %) of the respondents 
used Swaziland Building Society as their source of credit. Cooperatives were used by most 
(30 %) of the respondents in quasi-informal sources, followed by NGOs with 29 % of the 
respondents. Among the informal sources of credit, most respondents asked the help of 
friends and relatives (30 %) and moneylenders (24 %). From the results, it can be concluded 
                                                 
2
Swazibank, previously Swaziland Development and Savings Bank, is licensed to provide the full range of 
banking services, but is also required under its statutes to promote rural development, infrastructure 
development, and local empowerment. 
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that smallholder farmers in Swaziland mostly rely on informal finance and the statutory bank 
for their agricultural activities. 
Smallholder farmers and rural populations in developing countries, in general, have always 
faced constraints in obtaining credit financing. Indeed, Jessop et al. (2012) in their study 
revealed that most farmers in developing countries have no access to any kind of financial 
service (safekeeping and saving, credit, payments, insurance), which hinders the efficiency 
and security of their operations. Many farmers struggle to pay for their seasonal harvest 
inputs, and investing in agricultural technology and expansion is even more difficult. Lack of 
finance is one of the reasons why agricultural productivity in developing countries and sub-
Saharan Africa in particular, is low. In spite of vast agricultural potential, many African 
countries import large quantities of food, and this is not limited to countries where the climate 
is less kind to agriculture (e.g. Senegal and Tunisia). 
The lack of agricultural finance is as pressing as ever. In spite of government programmes 
undertaken over the years, supply and demand for financial services continue to be 
mismatched, in terms of both the types and the volume of services. Past government policies 
have not been able to remedy these shortcomings (Jessop et al., 2012). Nevertheless, recent 
innovations in agricultural finance have created renewed interest in the sector. Such 
innovations include value chain finance approaches involving traders and processors, 
warehouse receipt finance, agricultural (index) insurance, (rural) microfinance, just to name a 
few. 
Smallholders are typically trapped in poverty because they do not have the money required to 
invest in income-enhancing productive activities. This constraint has been addressed by a 
variety of smallholder credit schemes and a positive correlations between supplies of credit 
from formal credit institutions and expenditure on modern inputs exist, such as improved 
seeds, irrigation and fertiliser, that resulted in increased agricultural output (Wetengere & 
Kihongo, 2012). 
In terms of livestock credit, Jabbar et al. (2002) argued that there is less empirical evidence 
on the role of credit in the smallholder livestock sector. For example, contrary to 
expectations, the authors in their study revealed that the Grameen Bank in Bangladesh 
extends as much as 40–50 % of its loans to landless and poor farmers to acquire and raise 
livestock. The incentive for this is livestock’s potential for generating regular incomes and 
25 
 
realisable assets that are essential to enabling the beneficiaries to stay out of poverty in times 
of adversity. 
Jabbar et al. (2002) conducted a study on demand and supply for livestock credit in sub-
Saharan Africa and the study revealed that banks which offered rural finance had a common 
official objective of increasing lending of institutional credit to large numbers of smallholder 
livestock producers. To meet this objective, they had established specialised subsidised credit 
schemes and had opened branches in rural areas. Despite these mechanisms, the study 
revealed that few smallholder livestock producers actually obtained credit from formal 
financial institutions. Often, smallholder producers were screened out by the criteria for loan 
eligibility. 
For livestock farmers to gain access to formal finance, Jabbar et al. (2002) observed that the 
Central Bank in Uganda required potential borrowers to show evidence that they owned 
livestock infrastructure, which was partly what they wanted the loan for. In Ethiopia, they 
further observed that credit was allocated on political, rather than financial considerations, 
and it was given on concessionary terms to state farms and cooperatives, despite their poor 
performance and high levels of loan delinquency. Since this took up most of the funds, there 
was little left for the many smallholder producers who were, therefore, denied credit. In 
Nigeria and Uganda, the banks did not insist on collateral security. They usually based credit 
worthiness on the personal characteristics of potential borrowers. In cases where bank 
officials did not have sufficient information (information asymmetry) on a potential 
borrower, they tended to allocate credit on observable characteristics such as wealth or 
influence in the community. These factors screened out many potential smallholder 
borrowers who did not appear creditworthy or those they did not have complete information. 
Contrary to the empirical evidence in Jabbar et al. (2002), Abedullah et al. (2009) indicated 
that credit supply enhanced the income of livestock growers by more than 100 % and it is 
clearly defining the role of credit in livestock sector. Credit not only helps to expand the 
economies of size, but also helps to increase the productivity of the livestock sector from the 
available resources. Hence, expansion in the livestock sector could help to absorb the 
unemployed and untrained rural labour, which could help to mitigate the migration process of 
untrained rural labour towards cities. 
Lack of access to financial services by smallholders is normally seen as one of the constraints 
limiting their benefit from credit facilities, though in most cases, the access problem is 
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usually created by mostly formal financial institutions through their lending policies. This is 
displayed in the form of approved minimum loan amounts, complicated application 
procedures and restrictions on credit for specific purposes (Swain, 2007). In African 
countries, the total loan portfolio for agricultural credit is low, for example in Zambia, Mali, 
Kenya, and Ghana it was 19 %, 15 %, 5 % and 6 %, respectively (Jessop et al., 2012). 
Smallholder farmers’ access to finance has remained one of the major impediments to an 
agricultural revolution and the speedy eradication of poverty in Swaziland. The Government 
of Swaziland has endeavoured to enhance production in the sector by providing finance 
through the African Development Bank (ADB) to formal financial institutions for the purpose 
of financing agricultural activities, thus enhancing employment, consumption, rural and 
economic development and overall production (Msibi, 2009). Nevertheless, commercial 
banks are reluctant to lend to smallholder farmers because of perceived risk in the business 
venture. 
There are indications that the agricultural sector is underfunded. This is particularly the case 
for agricultural (crops and livestock) production and other agro-related activities of 
smallholder farmers on SNL, who produce more than 80 % of maize which is Swaziland’s 
staple food (MOA, 2012). Agricultural lending by financial institutions in the country is 
limited to serving large-scale corporate farms, like sugar and citrus estates, with which they 
have had long-standing credit relationships (Swazibank, 2011). The Swazibank is a parastatal 
that advocates providing targeted credit to agriculture at subsidised interest rates, and it has 
put in place conditions that make it difficult for small-scale farmers to access credit from the 
institution. One such condition is that a farmer must provide collateral security to obtain 
credit, which most small-scale farmers do not have (Swazibank, 2011). The small-scale 
farmers who do not have collateral, therefore, do not have access to credit from formal 
financial institutions in the country. Yet, even though they are unable to access credit from 
financial institutions, they are still expected to produce enough food and reduce poverty, the 
prevalence of which remains at 69 % (FAO, 2014). Farmers with access to credit are most 
likely to adopt high yield-enhancing interventions, while the shortage of credit constrains 
production. Dlamini (2000) observed that the important factor affecting the adoption of new 
technologies for the purchase of inputs is finance. Thus, the importance of agricultural credit 
in food production and income generating activities cannot be overemphasised. 
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In conclusion, agriculture and livestock farming has deep cultural roots among Swazi 
citizens, and has over time evolved to be the backbone of the country’s economic growth and 
major foreign exchange earner. The uncertainties arising from the agricultural process in 
Swaziland, such as dependency on rainfall and poor animal husbandry systems, have been 
making lending facilities hesitant to disburse loans to farmers for large-scale investments to 
boost productivity. A land title is one of the important prerequisites for loan qualification set 
by formal financial institutions, but this has been denied to most smallholder farmers. Thus 
not having land ownership has become a major factor limiting farmers’ capacity to access 
finance, which is a necessary component for investment in livestock farming. 
 
3.4 Determinants of access to credit by smallholder farmers 
Many farmers cite lack of financial capital as a major reason for not adopting beneficial 
technologies. Research has also suggested that farmers with lower access to credit, plant 
fewer high-yielding crop varieties and/or invest in fewer animal breeds of high quality 
(Etonihu et al., 2013 & Mohamed et al., 2013). In many developing countries, and 
particularly in rural areas, access to financial services, including credit and formal saving 
mechanisms, is limited. Even where financial services are available, they are often highly 
disadvantageous to smallholder farmers due to high interest rates charged and required 
collateral, which these farmers usually do not possess. For example, within a single market, 
interest rates often vary according to the characteristics of the borrower and the activity being 
financed. 
A study by Mohamed (2003) indicated five socio-economic factors which are important in 
influencing farmers to access credit from formal and quasi-formal financial sources: age, 
years of formal education, gender, income, and degree of awareness of available credit 
services. Contrary to socio-economic factors influencing access to credit, employing the 
logistic regression model in a study on determinants of smallholder farmers access to formal 
credit in Ethiopia, Yehuala (2008) indicated that participation in extension package 
programmes, experience in credit use from the formal sources, total cultivated land holding, 
number of livestock owned, collateral or group formation, and membership of farmers 
multipurpose cooperatives, were important factors influencing smallholder farmers’ access to 
formal credit. 
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Relative to Yehuala (2008), a study by Chauke et al. (2013) indicated that need for credit, 
attitude towards risks, distance between the lender and borrower, farmers’ perception of loan 
repayment and farmers’ perception of lending procedures, total value of assets possessed and 
actual time spent with extension officers had significant influence on farmers’ access to 
credit. 
Mohammed et al. (2013), in a study in Northern Ghana on social capital and access to credit 
by farmer-based organisations (FBOs), also employing a logistic regression for factors 
affecting access to credit by members of FBOs, indicated that FBOs’ homogeneity, network 
connections, level of trust, respect for contracts and the level of collective actions the FBOs 
members could undertake were significant factors. Mohammed et al. (2013) further 
concluded that the most important determinant of access to credit by farmers who are 
members of FBOs is the level of social capital which their FBOs can generate. 
Using a stepwise linear regression model to determine the relationship between socio-
economic characteristics of the farmers and their rate of accessibility to agricultural credit in 
Nigeria, Etonihu et al. (2013) revealed that education, type of credit sources, and distance to 
credit source were significant factors affecting individual rate of accessibility to agricultural 
credit in the study area. In relation to Etonihu et al. (2013), Dzadze et al. (2012), when 
employing a binary logit on determinants of access to formal credit, revealed that extension 
contacts, education level and owning a savings account had significant influence on access to 
credit. 
Muhongayirea et al. (2013) employed a binary logit regression analysis. The results reveal 
that the likelihood of farmers participating in formal credit markets successfully increases 
with education, off-farm incomes, and agricultural extension, and decreases with the presence 
of informal financial markets in the neighbourhood. The results by Vuong Quoc (2012) 
indicated that household capital endowments, family size, marital status, distance and 
location of the market centre affect both the probability and the amount of asking for credit in 
Vietnam. 
The main findings of the study by Mohamed and Temu (2008) suggested that a number of 
socio-economic factors are important in influencing farm households’ access to formal credit. 
These factors were the number of sources of access to credit, the possibility of keeping 
livestock, having a bank account, the value of productive assets owned, household income 
and the intensity of adoption of agricultural technologies. Masuku (2010) concluded that 
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improving lending terms and conditions in favour of small-scale agricultural enterprises 
would provide an important avenue for facilitating smallholder farmers’ access to credit. 
 
3.5 Summary 
This chapter reviewed literature on the role of credit in agricultural development and access 
to credit by smallholder and livestock farmers. A review of literature on access to credit by 
smallholder farmers in Swaziland and on the determinants of access to credit by smallholder 
farmers in developing countries was presented. The objective of the chapter was to study the 
international experience on access to credit and determinants of access in order to relate to 
Swaziland. 
Therefore it maybe concluded that farmers may have access to agricultural credit under some 
of the following factors; the type of credit sources, distance to credit sources, off-farm 
income, education and being a member of associations. These factors will enable the 
researcher to make comparisons with the obtained results of this investigation during the 
discussions of the results. 
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CHAPTER 4  
THE ROLE OF CONTRACTS IN IMPROVING ACCESS TO CREDIT 
4.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents a review of literature on the role of contracts in enhancing agricultural 
development, especially in gaining access to credit for smallholder cattle farmers. The 
literature review also covers the benefit and cost of contractual agreements and the 
determinants for participating in contracts. In developed countries, contracts are the primary 
method of handling sales of many livestock commodities, including dairy products, pigs, and 
broilers, as well as of major produce such as tobacco, fruit, and processed tomatoes 
(MacDonald et al., 2004). 
 
4.2 Nature and types of contracts 
Contract farming is defined as constituting an agreement between farmers and processing 
and/or marketing firms for the production and supply of agricultural products under forward 
agreements, frequently at predetermined prices (Eaton & Shepherd, 2001). The arrangement 
often involves the integrator/company in providing a degree of production support through, 
for example, the supply of inputs, credit and the provision of technical advice and the farmer. 
For the success of the contract, the farmer must commit to providing a specific commodity in 
quantities and at quality standards determined by the company. The company, on the other 
hand, agrees to support the farmer’s production and to purchase the commodity. 
A fundamental feature of contract farming is the shifting of risk from producers to 
processors, since it is a form of participation in the futures market. Production and price risks 
are important features of beef cattle farming. Access to credit is one of the widely cited 
reasons for contracting. Numerous studies of contract farming emphasise access to credit as 
being a principal incentive for farmers to enter into contracts (Hudson, 2000). In contract 
farming, credit for smallholder farmers can be accessed in the form of advances (from the 
contracting company) or the contract may be used as collateral to access credit from a formal 
financial institution (Sharma, 2008; Tongchure & Hoang, 2013). 
There are two forms of contracts that producers and market intermediaries are engaged in, 
that is, formal and informal contracts. In general, formal contracts are written contracts 
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between an integrator company and a farmer, where the rights and obligations of each party 
are strictly defined. Informal contracts are unwritten but nevertheless binding agreements 
between a farmer and the market intermediary, this can either be a trader for inputs or 
outputs, or with a cooperative where the farmer is a member of, on the provision of inputs or 
the marketing of output, or both (Catelo & Costales, 2014). 
There are three types of agricultural contracts and these are production, resource-providing 
and marketing contracts (Little & Watts, 1994; Eaton & Shepherd, 2001). In production 
contracts, the quality and quantity of production inputs are determined and supplied by the 
contracting firm/contractor. The compensation that the farmer receives for services is also 
decided by the contractor. In resource providing contracts, the contractor provides a market 
for the product, but also provides key inputs at various stages of production to farmers on a 
credit basis. Loans have to be repaid when the products are sold, the production decisions as 
well as a significant part of the risk lies with the farmer. For farmers, this type of contract 
reduces the risk of not getting appropriate inputs on time. The buyer benefits from lower 
selling prices and reliable supplies of required quality and quantity at the right time. A 
marketing contract refers to an agreement between a contractor and a farmer that sets a price 
and the market outlet before the products are ready to be marketed. Most management 
decisions remain the responsibility of the farmer. In marketing contracts, only the price risk is 
shared, whereas in production contracts, both production and price risks are shared by the 
farmer and contractor (Little & Watts, 1994). 
There are four models of contract farming arrangements, namely, centralised model, 
multipartite model, intermediary model, and the informal model (Eaton & Shepherd, 2001). 
The centralised model involves a centralised processor and/or buyer buying from a large 
number of small-scale farmers. The cooperation is vertically integrated and in most cases 
involves the provision of several services such as pre-financing of inputs, extension and 
transportation of produce from the farmer(s) to the processors’ processing plant. A 
multipartite contract farming model arises when a combination of two or more organisations 
(private agribusiness firms, state, international aid agencies or NGOs) work together to 
coordinate and manage the cooperation between buyers and farmers. In the intermediary 
model, there is no direct linkage between the processing firm and farmers. There are 
middlemen having a formal contract with a processing firm and informal contracts with 
farmers. As a result, it has several disadvantages in vertical coordination and in providing 
proper incentives. The informal model occurs when small companies contract informally with 
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farmers on a seasonal basis. The achievement of these companies depends on government 
support since they do not invest in technical support. Sometimes, farmers use this method to 
get credit from informal credit sources. 
Different contract models are available to farmers and agribusiness, ranging from simple 
buyback of produce to provision of inputs and services; single company model to consortium 
of companies (agri-input, processing, banks, etc.) including private and parastatal companies. 
The partnership will depend on the available institutions to support production and product 
markets, the commodity being produced, resource bases of producers and capacity of 
agribusiness firms. An example of a successful contract farming model that might be 
implemented in developing countries (other countries like India are practising it) in order to 
improve smallholder farmers access to credit, is presented in Figure 4.1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure ‎4.1: Tri-partite Agreement between farmer, company and bank 
Source: Sharma (2008) 
 
Participation in contract arrangements constitutes a choice. Choice implies the possibilities 
that farmers can attain, given their resources, but also symbolizes the barriers that they are 
confronted with, that constrain their ability to participate. Some farmers may choose to retain 
their independence in market transactions as they may already have the resources and 
linkages they need. The main potential reasons that smallholder farmers enter into contract 
farming may not be limited to access to credit but may include market security, skills 
transfer, access to technical assistance, income stability, farm family employment, access to 
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good quality inputs and production services, mitigating production, appropriate technology, 
marketing and price risks and market opportunities that would not otherwise have been 
available to them (Sharma, 2008). Farmers can gain access to credit directly through the 
contract farming scheme or indirectly from banks, using contract farming as collateral. In 
developing countries that seek to deepen the commercialisation of smallholder farmers, 
contract farming has become an attractive instrument. 
 
4.3 The benefits of contractual agreements for smallholder farmers 
Contracts can substantially reduce the income risks associated with price and production 
inconsistency and contract terms can be structured to tailor the degree of risk reduction 
offered. Livestock producers in developed countries frequently cite risk sharing as a major 
benefit of production and marketing contracts (Wooded, 2003). Contracts can be designed to 
improve incentives to lower production costs and deliver products with specific attributes. 
They can also facilitate coordination among stages of production, by speeding adoption of 
new technology; improving information flows; managing quality, uniformity, and delivery; 
and more importantly enhancing access to credit (Ruben et al., 2007). 
Contracts can potentially change the smallholder farmer’s subjective expected level of benefit 
in several ways. First, contracting may resolve market failures in: (i) financial markets, by 
providing or improving access to credit; (ii) insurance markets, by providing insurance 
against price risk; (iii) input markets, by providing access to the inputs necessary to produce 
high quality products; and (iv) information, more especially the uncertainties associated with 
the marketing and production of high-return, non-traditional commodities and the provision 
of agricultural extension services. 
Wooded (2003) highlighted the point that the institutional arrangement of contract farming 
has reduced the transactional cost and improved market efficiency to the benefit of the 
smallholder farmer. In Swaziland, the vertical poultry production contracts have 
commercialised the broiler supply chain smallholder agriculture through the provision of 
critical input provision (credit), assured markets, ‘favourable’ producer prices and knowledge 
on agriculture technologies to farmers and as a tool to rural development. The contracts are 
creditable for playing a key role in increasing profitability of broiler farming, reducing 
market risk and, above all, opening new markets (Masuku, 2011). Contract farming has 
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proved to be effective in the integration of smallholder farmers in that seasonal finance is 
provided to farmers, which they cannot access through normal commercial channels, as 
acknowledged by Wooded (2003). This has lightened the burden of sourcing scarce and 
expensive inputs for rural farmers. 
Masuku (2011) also observes that contract farming has given the broiler smallholder farmer 
the opportunity to earn income, as evidenced by the large participation of Swazi smallholder 
farmers in broiler production as a means of acquiring cash. Contract farming is less 
subjective if smallholder farmers are involved in the development of the contract, thus 
attaining political acceptability. As long as the farmer is not a tenant to the contractor, 
contract farming is less likely to be subject to criticism. 
 
4.4 The determinants of participation in contracts by smallholder farmers 
In general, participation in contract farming reflects two sides: the hurdling of physical and 
human capital qualification barriers put up by the contractor, and the valuing by the farmer of 
the services provided by the contract arrangement, as opposed to undertaking the production 
and marketing of the product independently. Even when options are there to engage in 
contracts, if the farmer deems he or she has what it takes to undertake the production and 
market risks on his or her own, and reap the entire fruits of the activity, he or she may prefer 
to operate as an independent producer (Ruben et al., 2007). 
In a case study by Catelo and Costales (2014), the econometric estimation of the determinants 
of participation in formal and informal contract farming indicated that in India, producers 
tend to shift back to being independent producers, possibly indicating that the terms of the 
contracts were too oppressive. This is after achieving a particular scale of production, gaining 
more experience in the production activity, and having access to non-farm income sources. In 
informal contracts, there are no common and uni-directional determinants of participation. 
The authors found that in dairy production in India, greater experience in dairy production 
appears to be a human capital asset appreciated by contractors. 
A study by Musara et al. (2011) showed that land size, dependency ratio, years of schooling, 
age of farmer, access to other income, and duration of growing cotton were significant factors 
in affecting participation in contract farming for smallholder cotton farmers in Zimbabwe. 
However, in the case of access to other income, Musara et al. (2011) also stated that when 
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smallholder farmers have higher levels of off-farm and non-farm income, farmers are less 
likely to participate in contract farming because they have enough to finance their farming 
activities and still remain with enough for contingencies. This brings into focus the argument 
which this study is trying to relay, that farmers who do not have access to credit will 
participate in contracts in order to improve their formal credit access status. 
Costales et al. (2007), in their study of determinants of participation in contract farming in 
pig production in Northern Vietnam, employed two regression models, namely, a 
multinomial logit model which was used to identify the factors that determine the likelihood 
of engagement in formal or informal contracts, and a simple probit model which was 
subsequently developed for the determinants of engagement in informal contract 
arrangements. The results of the logit model, specifically with respect to formal contracts 
with company integrators, indicated that older farmers, with longer formal education, with 
more time devoted to pig production, with larger agricultural land assets and located in a 
particular province, were more likely to participate in formal contract growing. The probit 
model results indicated that producers with longer formal education and whose main 
occupation is pig raising, specialisation in the full-cycle (farrow-to-finish), location of farm, 
access to formal credit and to commercial supply of inputs, are more likely to have informal 
contracts. In this study, the logic was that producers with relatively more constrained access 
to inputs and services (credit) were more likely to participate in formal agreements with 
intermediaries. 
The logit results of a study conducted by Mwambi et al. (2013) indicated that factors, such as 
education, access to credit and road condition, were significant in determining farmers’ 
participation in contract farming. Contrary to Costales et al. (2007), Mwambi et al. (2013) 
concluded that the significant and positive effect of access to credit was probably because 
farmers who can access credit are able to purchase farm inputs, as well as pay for proper 
storage and transport facilities. This means that farmers who have access to credit will 
participate in contracts because they are able to buy farm inputs for their production. 
Employing a logit analysis, Tongchure and Hoang (2013) showed that contract participation 
is significantly influenced by gender of household head, education of household members, 
number of agricultural groups, input costs, machinery costs, cassava incomes and credit 
access. In line with Costales et al. (2007), Tongchure and Hoang (2013) observed that 
farmers who did not get credit from financial institutions had an opportunity to participate in 
36 
 
contract farming more than the farmers who had access to credit. They further stated that 
sometimes the farmers obtained loans separately from an existing bank or credit agency, in 
which case the contract itself could serve as collateral. 
A study in India by Sharma (2008), when employing a two-stage Heckman model to explain 
the results, indicated that education, age, farm size, access to institutional credit, source of 
off-farm income and membership to an organisation were the socio-economic factors that 
influenced participation in contract farming. In the study, it was hypothesised that farm size, 
human capital, and credit constraints were related to the probability of being a participant in 
contract farming. Indeed, the hypothesis was not rejected. Furthermore, the positively 
significant coefficient of credit implied that the availability of institutional credit (through 
contract farming) encourages farmers to engage in contract farming, as they are less 
dependent on informal sources, mainly money lenders, for credit requirements. 
Vindicating the study by Sharma (2008), Wainaina et al. (2012), in their study in Kenya, 
indicated that among all the exogenous variables considered to influence participation in 
contract farming, age, education, farm income, off-farm income, gender, distance to the main 
road, risk attitude and education significantly influenced the probability of participation in 
poultry contract farming. 
Swain (2012) found that large-scale farmers with better irrigation facilities and more non-
farm income and access to institutional credit are more likely to be in contract modes of 
production. In addition, farmers with bigger family sizes are more likely to be in contract 
modes of production, as compared with others. Swain argued that in this scenario, contract 
farming practice may lead to higher inequality in the agrarian economy. These results are in 
line with a conclusion drawn by Simmons (2002) that smaller-scale farmers could be 
excluded from contracts because of selection bias by agribusiness firms in awarding contracts 
to larger farms, and might be adversely affected by the second-round effects of contracts on 
incomes and prices and suffer from narrowing of markets that lie outside of contracts. 
When agribusiness firms have the power to pick and choose smallholders for contracts, there 
are a number of selection factors that seem to be common across contracts. These include 
previous farming experience of the smallholder, fertility of farms, farm size and community 
considerations. These were factors drawn after analysis to observe successful contract 
performance by farmers. All of the literature reviewed assumed that agribusiness firms 
selected smallholders for contracts and the possibility of self-selection by smallholders is 
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referred to only indirectly. This reflects that contracting firms are usually perceived to hold 
the power in relationships with smallholders and, by implication, can pick and choose 
partners for contracts. The distinction between selection by the agribusiness firm and self-
selection is important, since with self-selection, smallholders with most to gain would be the 
ones most likely to enter contracts. That is, smaller, more constrained enterprises that were 
not doing well in the spot market system would have strong incentives to negotiate contracts. 
Alternatively, if selection is by agribusiness firms, larger, less constrained smallholders with 
lower unit costs and less risk exposure could be the most attractive partners. 
The relationship between contract farming and access to credit, together with factors 
affecting participation in contracts and access to credit, is depicted in Figure 4.2.The figure 
shows that the relationship between contract farming and access to credit is influenced by 
farmer characteristics and institutional factors. Farmer characteristics include socio-
demographic characteristics, asset ownership, off-farm income, gender roles, skills and 
knowledge, and market orientation while institutional factors are government policies, legal 
and institutional framework related to finance and agricultural research, extension, marketing, 
input supply and financial institution (access to credit is influenced by lending policies, 
borrowing conditions and procedures, loan portfolio size and scope). 
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Figure ‎4.2: The relationship between contract farming and access to credit and their 
determinants 
Source: Adapted from Mohamed and Temu (2008) 
 
As shown in Figure 4.2, financial institution, farmer characteristics, government policies, 
legal and institutional framework related to finance and indirectly by agricultural institution 
influence access to credit. Further, contract farming will improve access to credit taking into 
consideration the nature of the contract, farmer characteristics, agricultural institution and 
government policies. Access to credit will influence contract participation depending on the 
financial institution, farmer characteristics, government policies, legal and institutional 
framework related to financial services. 
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4.5 Summary 
This chapter presented a review of literature on the role of contracts in enhancing agricultural 
development, especially access to credit for smallholder cattle farmers. The literature 
reviewed also covered the benefit and cost of contractual agreements and determinants of 
participating in contracts. From the reviewed literature in Chapter 3 and in this chapter, this 
study hypothesises that certain socio-economic factors influence smallholder farmers’ access 
to credit from formal financial institutions. The study further hypothesises that certain socio-
economic factors influence smallholders’ participation in contractual agreements and that 
farmers with contractual agreements positively enhance their access to formal credit from 
formal financial institutions.  
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CHAPTER 5  
METHODS AND PROCEDURES 
5.1 Introduction 
The objective of this chapter is to describe the methodology and procedures used to 
investigate the role of contracts in promoting access to credit for smallholder cattle farmers, 
cattle fatteners and traders in Swaziland. The step-by-step description of the study area, the 
type of investigation, the sampling design, the data collection process and analysis are 
presented below. Under data analysis, two logistic regression models are described and 
presented, that is, the model for contract agreements and the model for access to credit. 
 
5.2 The study area 
5.2.1 Location 
The study was conducted in SWADE development project areas in the Lubombo District, 
about 300 km from Mbabane, and in the Hhohho District, about 170 km from Mbabane 
(green colour in Figure 5.1). The study area is located in the Lowveld, which is one of the 
ecological zones in Swaziland. This area was chosen because the LUSIP project, LUSIP-GEF 
(Global Environmental Facility) and KDDP project allow smallholder rural farmers to have 
access to irrigated land for sugarcane farming and other agricultural activities, and being able 
at the same time to conserve natural resources and the environment. 
 
5.2.2 Climate 
The mean annual rainfall ranges from 440 mm to 570 mm and the mean annual evapo-
transpiration is 2 057 mm. About 70 % of the annual rainfall within the hot, summer rainy 
season occurs from October to March. The mean annual temperature in winter ranges from a 
minimum of 5° C to a maximum of 20° C. 
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Figure ‎5.1: A site map showing the agricultural development area under SWADE 
Source: SWADE (2013) 
 
5.3 Sampling design and data collection 
5.3.1 Sampling design 
A stratified random sampling procedure was applied, using smallholder cattle farmers from 
the Lubombo and Hhohho Districts in the Lowveld ecological zone of Swaziland. Cattle 
farmers and traders under SWADE development areas, that is, LUSIP, LUSIP-GEF and 
KDDP, were targeted for the survey. The list of farmers and traders was sourced from 
42 
 
SWADE database, the GIS department. The target population, which had a population size of 
892, was divided into three strata, that is, 757 cattle producers, 22 cattle traders, and 113 
cattle finishers. The farmers were then randomly selected to give a total sample of 111 
respondents who were then interviewed in the survey. Fifty-three cattle producers (53) were 
randomly selected as the sample frame from dip tanks under the different project areas under 
SWADE. Thirty-six (36) cattle finishers were randomly selected to form part of the sampling 
frame while the whole strata of 22 cattle traders were used and organised into groups. Table 
5.1 presents details of the sample. 
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Table ‎5.1: Selected areas and sampled respondents 
District Study Areas Population 
Number (892) 
Sampled 
Number 
(111) 
Respondent 
category 
% number of 
respondents sampled 
(12.4%) 
Hhohho 
(KDDP) 
 
Sihoye 
Mangweni 
Tshaneni 
Nhlanguyavuka 
20 
99 
4 
115 
6 
8 
4 
7 
Finishers 
Producers 
Traders 
Producers 
30.0 
8.1 
100.0 
6.1 
Lubombo 
(LUSIP) 
Sithobela 
Siphofaneni 
Madlenya 
Ncandweni 
Ndzevane 
Lubuli 
Gamula 
Ngoni 
Madubeni 
Siphofaneni 
110 
6 
30 
107 
194 
5 
22 
7 
132 
41 
8 
6 
10 
10 
11 
5 
8 
7 
9 
12 
Producers 
Traders 
Finishers 
Producers 
Producers 
Traders 
Finishers 
Traders 
Producers 
Finishers 
7.3 
100.0 
33.3 
9.3 
5.7 
100.0 
36.4 
100.0 
6.8 
29.3 
 
5.3.2 Data collection 
Data were collected from both primary and secondary data sources. In a first step, Focused 
Group Discussions (FGDs) were used to collect primary data. This was done between 
October 2013 and February 2014. In a second step, the information collected through FGDs 
were complemented by face-to-face interviews with the three types of stakeholders 
(producers, finishers and traders) during the period between April and May, 2014. Personal 
interviews were conducted to gather information on farmers’ access to credit and 
involvement in contractual agreements with other stakeholders in the value chain. Secondary 
data were sourced from MOA, the livestock department, SWADE, Geographic Information 
System (GIS) unit from Lusip Information System (LIMS) department and the internet. 
The study made use of primary data collected by means of structured questionnaires, from 
cattle producer-finishers and beef cattle traders (Appendices A and B). Data collected 
included stakeholders’ socio-economic characteristics, cattle production and marketing, 
income received from cattle trading and other activities, involvement in contractual 
agreements, and access to credit. 
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The cattle producer-finisher questionnaire was divided into six sections: producers-finisher 
identification, farming and livestock inventory, cattle trading, market information, extension 
services and training, cattle fattening, and credit and loans. The cattle traders’ questionnaire 
was divided into five sections: trader identification, cattle trading, cattle fattening, credit and 
loans, and risk assessment. 
The survey of the population was conducted at the dip tanks for cattle producers and 
scheduled interviews were conducted for cattle traders and finishers. Before collecting the 
data, the questionnaires were reviewed by personnel from International Livestock Research 
Institute (ILRI), MOA (from the livestock department), and SWADE, and then pre-tested 
through a small number of beef producers and beef traders in the Manzini region of 
Swaziland in order to verify their validity and reliability prior to use. 
 
5.4 Data analysis 
The collected data were coded and entered into Excel and analysed using the Statistical 
Package for Social Sciences software (SPSS 20.0 for Windows). Descriptive analysis was 
used to visualise the demographic composition of the smallholder beef cattle producers, 
finishers and traders in the survey, such as average age, education, gender, non-farm income, 
access to credit, contract agreements, and land size. Descriptive analysis was also used to 
analyse the variables used in the study for cattle farmers and traders, using frequencies, 
averages/means and standard deviations. 
Logistic regression analysis was used to analyse the influence of independent variables (age, 
gender, education level, income in other business per month, association member, farm size, 
herd size, cattle sold, cattle fattening, market information, access to training services, market 
access, access to extension services, bank account, and loan facility) on a binary/dichotomous 
dependent variable (access to credit and contract agreement).  
Logit regression (logit) analysis was chosen because it is a uni/multivariate technique which 
allows for estimating the probability that an event occurs or not, by predicting a binary 
dependent outcome from a set of independent variable (stated above). The justification for 
using logit is its simplicity of calculation and that its probability lies between 0 and 1. 
Moreover, its probability approaches zero at a slower rate as the value of explanatory variable 
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gets smaller and smaller, and the probability approaches 1 at a slower rate as the value of the 
explanatory variable gets larger (Gujarati, 1995). 
Therefore, the logit model takes the following functional form (Greene, 2012): 
 𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑏(𝑌 = 1|𝑥) =
𝑒𝑥
,𝛽
1 + 𝑒𝑥,𝛽
= Ë(𝑥′𝛽)                                                                                             (1)  
Where: 
𝑌: Dependent variable taking the values of 0 or 1 
𝑥: Vector of independent variables 
𝛽: Vector of coefficients to be estimated 
Ë: Logistic cumulative distribution function 
The logistic regression uses a maximum likelihood method, which maximises the probability 
of getting the observed results, given the fitted regression coefficients, instead of using a least 
squared deviations criterion used in a linear regression. Taking the natural logarithms of the 
odds ratio of equation 1we obtain the linearity of the logit model, that is equation 
2.Therefore, the probability that a stakeholder will have access to credit and/or engage in a 
contractual agreement is given by: 
𝐼𝑛 (𝑂𝐷𝐷𝑆) =  𝐼𝑛 (
Ŷ
(1 −  Ŷ)
) =  𝑎 +  𝑏𝑋                                                                                     (2) 
Where Ŷ =1, 1- Ŷ = 0, and X = independents variables 
That is, the log of odds ratio is not only linear in X, but also linear in the parameters. As Y 
goes from 0 to 1, the Log (y) scale ranges from negative infinity to positive infinity and is 
symmetrical around the log of 0.5 (which is zero). Relating the regression equation (a + bX 
…..) which is a linear formula, to the logistic regression equation, the equation 2 in an 
extended form may be written as: 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡[𝑦 (𝑥)] = log [
𝑦(𝑥)
(1 − 𝑦(𝑥))
] =  𝑎 +  𝑏1𝑋1 +  𝑏2𝑋2 +  … … +  𝑏𝑛𝑋𝑛                          (3) 
Taking the error term (𝜀) into account, the logit model becomes: 
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𝑙𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 (𝑦) =  𝑎 +  𝑏1𝑥1 +  𝑏2𝑥2 +  𝑏3𝑥3 +  … … + 𝜀(4) 
Hence, the above model was used in this study and was treated against the potential variables 
affecting smallholder farmers’ access to credit and involvement in contractual agreements. 
The coefficient of the logit model presents the change in the log of the odds associated with a 
change in the explanatory variables. 
 
5.4.1 Model estimation 
One of the main objectives of the study is to measure the overall access to credit of each 
stakeholder. Factors and characteristics that influence availability and access to credit were 
identified together with factors that determine involvements in contracts. A logit regression 
analysis is a model which allows for estimating the probability that an event occurs or not, by 
predicting a binary dependent outcome from a set of independent variables. A regression 
analysis was conducted for the study where the probability that a farmer had access to credit 
and also engaged in a contract, introduced as a dummy variable (1 for yes and 0 for no), was 
the dependent variable. The use of the logit regression model is attributable to the fact that 
the dependent variable (access to credit and contract agreement) depicts the probability that a 
cattle farmer has access, or does not have access to credit from financial institutions or 
engages, or not, in contractual arrangements with other actors in the value chain. Access to 
credit/contract agreement takes up a dichotomous criterion variable, that is, 1 =Yes, 0 = No.  
 
5.4.2 Model for contract agreement 
The model was estimated to identify significant factors that influence a farmer to engage in 
contractual agreements with other actors in the value chain. The logit model was also used to 
further identify these factors and to attempt to answer the question “What are the 
chances/possibilities of smallholder farmers to be freely involved or engage in contractual 
arrangements?” 
From a theoretical point of view, farmers engage in contractual agreements in order to 
improve cattle production, marketing and management practices. To identify these factors, 
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the logit model is estimated as in equations 6 and 7, where the dependent variables are 
contract agreement (yes = 1, no = 0) and access to credit (yes = 1, no = 0), respectively. 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 (𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑎𝑐𝑡 𝑎𝑔𝑟𝑒𝑒𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡)
=  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐺𝑒𝑛𝑑𝑒𝑟 + 𝛽2𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 + 𝛽3𝐸𝑥𝑡𝑒𝑛𝑠𝑖𝑜𝑛 + 𝛽4𝐴𝑀 + 𝛽5𝐴𝑀𝐼 
+  𝛽6𝐹𝐴 +  𝛽7𝐶𝑟 +  𝛽8𝐵𝐴 +  𝛽9𝐿𝐹 +  𝛽10𝐴𝑔𝑒 +  𝜀                                 (6) 
 
Contract agreement (CA): in the model as a dependent variable, is measured by whether a 
stakeholder was involved in a contractual agreement with other stakeholders in the value 
chain or not. 
The independent variables are 
Gender: This is expected to have a positive effect for males. Females usually do not have 
access to land and, thus, they are usually excluded in agricultural investments. 
Age: Younger farmers are hypothesised to be more likely to participate in contract farming 
than their older counterparts, as they are more innovative. However, in Swaziland cattle 
farmers are mostly the aged and, thus, age will have a negative effect on contract farming. 
Training: Training broadens farmers’ knowledge, especially with respect to the use of 
improved production technologies, and provides farmers with current information on 
production, diseases, record keeping and other farm management strategies. This improves 
beef cattle production, as well as the use of resources, and enables farmers to make informed 
decisions. Training will enable farmers to know the benefits and challenges of being involved 
in a contract and a positive effect is expected.  
Extension: Farmers who have better access to extension services are more likely to 
participate in contract farming and, therefore, a positive effect is expected. This is because 
they receive advice from extension agents on the better and latest technology to use to 
improve their productivity. 
Access to market (AM): This is expected to have a negative effect on a farmer becoming 
involved in a contract agreement with other actors in the value chain. This is attributed to the 
fact that they may easily trade their own product in that market. 
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Access to market information (AMI): Access to information will influence the farmers’ 
engagement in contracts. It is expected to have a positive influence on engagement in 
contracts with relevant stakeholders or value chain actors. 
Farmers Association (FA): Farmers who are members of farmers’ associations are more 
likely to participate in contract farming. This is expected to have a positive influence in 
contract involvement. This is because collective action enables small-scale farmers to attain 
better bargaining power, economies of scale and reduce transaction costs. 
Credit (Cr): Farmers who have better access to credit offered by formal financial institutions 
are expected to be less likely to participate in contract farming. This is because if a farmer has 
access to credit, it is predicted that he or she will be able to produce more and sell the product 
in the market. Thus, it is hypothesised that farmers with low or no access to credit will 
willingly participate in contracts in order to gain access to credit or to use the contract as 
collateral for credit from formal financial institutions. 
Bank Account (BA): It is hypothesised that farmers with a bank account are more likely to 
participate in contract farming and, thus, a positive effect is expected. 
Loan Facility (LF): It is hypothesised that farmers who have received a loan for their 
agricultural production will be less likely to participate in contract farming. Therefore, a 
negative effect on participating in contract farming is expected. 
Error‎ term‎ (ε):‎ Error term represents the unpredicted or unexplained variation in the 
dependent variable. This is under the assumption that ε is normally distributed, has a zero 
mean, constant variance, and is not correlated with the explanatory variables. 
 
5.4.3 Model for access to credit 
The logit model was estimated to identify significant factors affecting access to credit. The 
model is designed to present factors that determine the probability that a financial provider 
will give credit to a cattle farmer. 
Theoretically, when each stakeholder has access to credit they may have access to formal 
markets in order to improve cattle production, marketing and management practices. To 
identify these factors, the logit model is estimated as in equations 6 and 7, where the 
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dependent variables are contract agreement (yes = 1, no = 0) and access to credit (yes = 1, no 
= 0), respectively. 
𝐿𝑜𝑔𝑖𝑡 (𝐴𝑐𝑐𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑡𝑜 𝐶𝑟𝑒𝑑𝑖𝑡)
=  𝛼 +  𝛽1𝐴𝑔𝑒 +  𝛽2𝐻𝑒𝑟𝑑𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 +  𝛽3𝐹𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑠𝑖𝑧𝑒 +  𝛽4𝑂𝐼 +  𝛽5𝐴𝑀𝐼 
+  𝛽6𝑇𝑟𝑎𝑖𝑛𝑖𝑛𝑔 +  𝛽7𝐶𝐴 + 𝛽8𝐶𝐹
+ 𝜀                                                                                                                                  (7) 
 
The dependent variable is Access to credit (Cr) and in the analysis is measured by the 
probability of having access to credit from formal financial service providers. 
The independent variables are 
Age: This is expected to have a positive effect on access of credit. Older farmers are more 
knowledgeable and are believed to be more efficient in resource use or allocation than 
younger farmers are, and therefore financial institutions are able to provide finance to 
farmers. 
Herd size (Hsize): Cattle herd size is an indication of a farmer’s wealth. Cattle ownership or 
herd size was measured by asking respondents how many cattle they owned. Farmers with 
large cattle numbers are expected to easily convert cattle into cash. Hence, herd size is 
hypothesised to have a negative effect on access to credit from financial institutions. 
Farm size (Fsize): The amount of land a farmer has is influenced by the number of cattle 
owned. If the size of land is large, farmers are able to engage in production activities, such as 
fattening, to add value to their product in readiness for the market. Farm size is expected to 
have a positive influence on farmers accessing loans from formal financial institutions. 
Off-farm Income (OI): A steady income or income from other businesses may have a 
positive influence on farmers accessing loans from financial institutions, as this will enable 
them to service the loan, even if the intended business fails (Sharma & Zeller, 1997). 
Access to market information (AMI): Access to market information is expected to have a 
positive influence on access to credit by cattle farmers, as this improves knowledge on prices, 
grades, breed, type and age of beef cattle for market specification. 
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Training: Training broadens farmers’ knowledge, especially with respect to the use of 
improved production technologies, and provides farmers with current information on 
production, diseases, record keeping and other farm management strategies. This improves 
beef cattle production, as well as the use of resources, and enables farmers to make informed 
decisions. A positive coefficient is expected for access to finance. 
Contract agreement (CA): Contract agreements with either supplier of cattle, feeds, 
veterinary services and formal markets are important. This is expected to have a positive 
influence, as this shows that farmers have markets for their products. This is measured as a 
dummy, assuming a value of one if the farmer has contract agreement with other actors in the 
value chain, and zero otherwise. 
Cattle fattening (CF): Cattle fattening is an activity where farmers add value to beef cattle 
in order to take advantage of higher prices. This is expected to have a positive influence on 
access to credit as farmers and finishers produce commercially, thus this activity is taken as a 
business venture. 
 
5.5 Summary 
This Chapter has described the study area, methodology and procedures used to carry out this 
investigation. It provided justification or supporting statements for the choice of methodology 
and discussed the questionnaires and models used as the main data collection instrument and 
data analysis, respectively. The study employed two logistic models, that is, contract 
participation and access to credit. The logistic model was found to be a good fit for the 
estimated models of the study allowing binary analysis of the results by predicting a binary 
dependent outcome from a set of the given explanatory variables. 
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CHAPTER 6  
SOCIO-ECONOMIC CHARACTERISTICS OF THE SAMPLE 
6.1 Introduction 
This chapter presents the findings of the study. It presents the descriptive analysis of 
smallholder cattle farmers, finishers and traders in Swaziland in detail. Characteristics of 
cattle producers, finishers and traders, the types of contracts farmers are involved in, farmers’ 
involvement in farmers’ associations, and other services are presented and discussed in detail. 
 
6.2 Respondents’‎socio-demographic characteristics 
6.2.1 Age, gender and educational level of cattle producers, finishers and traders 
Generally in Swaziland, most individuals who own cattle are males and most of them are old. 
This statement is in line with the results from the survey where random sampling was 
employed using an exhaustive list of traders, finishers and producers, as shown in Table 6. 
The average age of cattle producers is 50.3 years, and 51.3 years for cattle traders. This is a 
crucial variable in cattle production, as young farmers are considered to have a risk-taking 
attitude since they are willing to experience new or innovative technologies. Cattle finishers 
have the lowest average age (45.4 years), and the highest proportion of females (44 %), 
compared with the producers and traders groups. This may be attributed to the fact that most 
cooperatives encourage the participation of females who are generally excluded from more 
rewarding agricultural opportunities because they lack resources, such as land. 
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Table ‎6.1: Gender, age and education of cattle stakeholders 
Variables Definition Cattle Producers 
n=53 
Cattle Finishers 
n=36 
Cattle Traders 
n=22 
Gender (%) Male 
Female 
71.7 
28.3 
55.6 
44.4 
90.9 
9.1 
Age (years) Mean
*
 
Min/Med./Max 
50.3 (13.12) 
28/53/75 
45.4 (13.24) 
21/46.5/70 
51.32 (11.8) 
29/51.5/82 
Education (%) Illiterate 
Literate 
Primary 
Secondary 
Tertiary 
32.1 
9.4 
35.9 
22.6 
0.0 
25.0 
8.3 
25.0 
36.1 
5.6 
0.0 
22.7 
50.0 
13.6 
13.6 
*Figures in parentheses are standard deviations 
 
Table 6.1indicates that out of 22 cattle traders interviewed, 91 % were males. Cattle traders 
are mostly cattle producers who are also involved in cattle trading within a region, or all over 
Swaziland. They are called bogalajane in siSwati, meaning they act as agents by securing 
cattle markets for cattle producers and charge a commission through a mark-up on the 
original cattle price, thus behaving like brokers. Some have transited to engage in cattle 
trading formally (23 % of cattle traders are engaged in cattle trading as a formal business). 
From Table 6.1, it is observed that only 28 % of cattle producers are females (some were 
assisting their employed husbands who had migrated elsewhere to seek employment). 
In addition, the level of education of cattle farmers plays an important role in decision-
making and the adoption of new technologies, thus improving cattle production and 
marketing. Results indicate that 59 % of cattle producers had formal education and 9 % had 
informal education, while 32 % were illiterate (respondents older than 60 years). Cattle 
fatteners had the highest percentage of people with secondary school education (36 %). Out 
of all the cattle farmers, cattle traders (14 %) had tertiary level of education, with 6 % of 
cattle finishers, while cattle producers had none.  
6.2.2 Major sources of income 
Cattle farmers interviewed derived their livelihood from different activities apart from beef 
cattle production. Bearing in mind that the respondents were sampled from the LUSIP and 
KDDP areas where sugarcane and vegetable production are the main agricultural activities, 
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30 % of cattle producers depend on sugarcane farming (in fact, dividends from sugarcane 
sales are their main source of income) as indicated in Figure 6.1. Due to diversification, 30 % 
of cattle producers depend on other agricultural activities, such as vegetable and maize 
production each. It is also estimated that cattle finishers (36 %) derive their income from 
sugarcane farming and other agricultural activities, such as cotton farming and legume 
production. About 45 % of cattle traders mostly derive their income from beef cattle trading, 
as other livestock (goats, sheep) are in low demand in the market. Overall, 13 % of all cattle 
stakeholders derive their income from non-agricultural activities. 
The mean level of monthly income in other business activities for cattle producers, finishers 
and cattle traders ranges between E1000–E2000 and E2001–E5000, respectively. The share 
of income from cattle trading for cattle traders is 40 % of their overall income. The high 
percentage of cattle producers (72 %) deriving their income from beef cattle is attributed to 
the fact that most cattle producers are unemployed, and they sell cattle for household income 
and to pay school fees. This, however, does not mean that they are commercially involved in 
beef cattle production. About 28 % of cattle producers interviewed had not sold cattle in the 
past two years. This has led to the encouragement of cattle producers to commercialise 
livestock production in order to derive more income from the business and improve the 
economic status of livestock production in the country. 
 
Figure ‎6.1: Percentage of income derived from various sources for cattle producers, 
finishers and traders 
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6.2.3 Cattle‎farmers’ endowment 
Land is the most important asset, as the majority of the respondents derived their livelihood 
from farm-based activities. The area surveyed falls under SNL, which is held in trust of the 
Swazi nation by the King through Chiefs who allocates usufruct rights to individual Swazi 
families, which rights may also be inherited from relatives. From the results, it can be 
gathered that the average land size for cattle producers, finishers and traders interviewed was 
3.5, 2.3 and 3.8 hectares, respectively. This land is mainly used for vegetables, maize and 
cotton farming. During the off-season, cattle are allowed to graze in the fields. A minority 
(13.1 %) of the cattle farmers interviewed either share land with other family members or 
members of their association for farming (sugarcane or vegetable production). 
Table 6.2 shows the asset ownership of the cattle farmers interviewed. Apart from land and 
cattle ownership, cattle farmers own a number of assets, such as vehicles, ploughs, and 
permanent homes. Only a minority (9.1% for traders and 1.9% for producers) of cattle 
farmers from SNL own rental buildings in urban areas. Assets play a crucial role when it 
comes to gaining access to credit, as they are considered as collateral. From the survey 
results, cattle farmers do not have assets that can be considered as collateral when taking up a 
loan for livestock production because their permanent houses are located in SNL (not 
considered as collateral) as this land is communal, and most of their vehicles are imports 
(insurance companies do not insure these). 
Table ‎6.2: Asset ownership by cattle producers, finishers and traders 
Asset Cattle Producers (%) 
n=53 
Cattle Finishers (%) 
n=36 
Cattle Traders (%) 
n=22 
Rental buildings 1.9 0.0 9.1 
Permanent home 98.1 91.7 100.0 
Vehicle ownership 20.8 25.0 54.5 
Land 86.8 72.2 77.3 
Others:    
Plough 15.1 0.0 4.5 
Bicycle 7.5 8.0 0.0 
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6.2.4 Livestock ownership 
In general, livestock keeping forms part of the Swazi tradition and is still considered a source 
of social status. From the survey results, all the cattle farmers interviewed own livestock, 
such as cattle, goats, sheep and chickens. Cattle traders’ ownership of livestock was not 
documented, but 68 % cattle traders interviewed owned cattle. 
Figure 6.2 shows cattle distribution among cattle producers and finishers. Farmers 
interviewed owned cattle, ranging from 2 to 74 head. The numbers may not necessarily 
represent the actual number of cattle owned by the farmer, as farmers were reluctant to reveal 
their real cattle numbers. The Government of Swaziland, through the Swaziland Revenue 
Authority, is investigating and exploring ways of how cattle farmers might start paying tax 
(Times of Swaziland, 2014). Cattle ownership is skewly distributed, with 41 % of cattle 
producers owning less than 10 cattle, while at the other extreme, 2 % have more than 60 
cattle. The rest of cattle producers fall within this continuum. For cattle finishers, livestock 
ownership is almost evenly distributed for herd size of up to 50 cattle. Only 3 % cattle 
fatteners own more than 60 animals. 
 
Figure ‎6.2: Cattle distribution among cattle producers and finishers (%) 
 
Table 6.3 shows the composition of herd size, with the mean herd size for cattle producers 
and finishers being 17.4 and 18.4, respectively. It is evident from the table that more cattle 
producers have female cattle than male cattle. Only 40 % of cattle producers own male cattle 
that are aged more than four years, while 22 % of cattle finishers own this category of cattle. 
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The table also shows that most cattle farmers own younger cattle than old cattle. This may be 
attributed to the impact of the training by SMI in the dip tanks about the marketing of the 
different types of cattle and their sale prices. 
Table ‎6.3: Composition of herd size 
Variable Cattle Producer (%) Cattle Finisher (%) 
  n=53  n=36 
Composition: 
<6 months males 
<6 months females 
6-24 months males 
6-24 months females 
2-4 years males 
2-4 years females 
>4 years males 
>4 years females 
  
62.3 
66.0 
66.0 
67.9 
52.8 
64.2 
39.6 
54.7 
  
52.8 
44.4 
38.9 
38.9 
25.0 
33.3 
22.2 
41.7 
Average herd size
*
 17.5 (14.6) 18.3 (18.4) 
*Figures in parentheses are standard deviations 
6.3 Types of contract agreements 
6.3.1 Trading contract agreement 
Cattle trading in Swaziland is not operated as a commercial business, which is why contract 
arrangements are rare, and if done, it is usually under verbal contracts. From the interviewed 
population, around 40 % of cattle producers, 53 % of cattle finishers, and 46 % of cattle 
traders are engaged in verbal purchasing contracts. Of these, 40 % and 53 % of cattle 
producers and cattle finishers, respectively, have verbal purchasing contracts with buyers, 
such as, butchers and SMI, while 27 % of cattle producers have verbal contracts with 
butchery owners and 33 % of cattle finishers have verbal contracts with SMI. Half of cattle 
traders surveyed have verbal contracts with butchers, producers or SMI. About 36 % of cattle 
traders have verbal contracts with butchers, and 9.1 % of them have verbal contract with SMI. 
Table 6.4 shows the contents of a verbal purchasing contract that a cattle buyer may enter 
into with cattle suppliers. This contract shows that when cattle buyers buy cattle, they look 
for certain characteristics and aspects. Cattle buyers (such as butchers, SMI, abattoirs, traders 
and farmers) observe the following before buying: season (time of year), price, condition of 
animal, weight of animal, age of animal, animal regime followed, conditions and timing of 
payments, and transport of animals at the time of sale. 
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Table ‎6.4: Contents of verbal purchasing contracts 
Variable Definition Cattle Producers 
(%) 
n=53 
Cattle Finishers 
(%) 
n=36 
Cattle Traders 
(%) 
n=22 
Time of purchase: Yes 
No 
35.8 
3.8 
47.2 
5.6 
31.8 
13.6 
Price for purchase Yes 
No 
39.6 
0.0 
36.1 
16.7 
45.5 
0.0 
Price/kg or price/animal Yes 
No 
28.3 
11.3 
47.2 
5.6 
31.8 
13.6 
Condition of animal Yes 
No 
39.6 
0.0 
50.0 
2.8 
45.5 
0.0 
Weight of animal Yes 
No 
28.3 
11.3 
44.4 
8.3 
31.8 
13.6 
Age of animal Yes 
No 
39.6 
0.0 
41.7 
11.1 
45.5 
0.0 
Feeding regime followed Yes 
No 
15.1 
24.5 
38.9 
13.9 
22.7 
22.7 
Breeding Yes 
No 
13.2 
26.4 
22.2 
30.6 
18.2 
27.2 
Transport of feed Yes 
No 
1.9 
37.7 
30.6 
22.2 
0.0 
45.5 
Animal Health regime 
followed 
Yes 
No 
35.8 
3.8 
47.2 
5.6 
36.4 
9.1 
Conditions and timing of 
payment 
Yes 
No 
34.0 
5.7 
41.7 
11.1 
45.5 
0.0 
Supply of feed Yes 
No 
3.8 
35.8 
22.2 
30.6 
0.0 
45.5 
Supply of any other livestock 
services/inputs by buyer 
Yes 
No 
1.9 
37.7 
13.9 
38.9 
9.1 
36.4 
Supply of any cropping 
services or inputs by buyer 
Yes 
No 
0.0 
39.6 
11.1 
41.7 
4.5 
40.9 
Agreement surrounding 
labour or wage 
Yes 
No 
5.7 
34.0 
19.4 
33.3 
4.5 
40.9 
Exchange of any consumer 
goods 
Yes 
No 
3.8 
35.8 
13.9 
38.9 
9.1 
36.4 
Transport of animals at any 
time during growth 
Yes 
No 
5.7 
34.0 
16.7 
36.1 
0.0 
45.5 
Transport of animals at time 
of sale 
Yes 
No 
24.5 
15.1 
38.9 
13.9 
36.4 
9.1 
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When negotiating for sale, cattle buyers rarely observe or enquire as to the following: 
breeding, transport of feed, supply of feed, supply of any other livestock/cropping services or 
inputs by buyer, agreements surrounding labour or wage, exchange of any consumer goods, 
and transport of animals at any time during growth. Concerning cattle farmers who sell cattle 
under verbal contractual agreements, 15 % cattle producers, 39 % cattle finisher and 23 % 
cattle traders observe whether a feeding regime is followed. In the verbal contract between 
traders and their suppliers, 23 % of cattle traders pay cattle suppliers on the spot, while 14 % 
of cattle traders pay the supplier after the sale of cattle. 
 
6.4 Access to services 
Table 6.5 provides information on access to extension, market information and training, all of 
which play a vital role in the promotion of livestock production and marketing, thereby 
improving farm income and human capital. According to the survey results in Table 6.5, 
29 % and 42 % of sampled cattle producers and cattle finishers, respectively, have access to 
extension services. Access to extension services is one of the factors for successful 
feedlotting and cattle production, as farmers need the relevant expertise to improve their 
production capabilities. Results show that farmers are still unable to access these services. 
The provision of extension services to farmers in Swaziland is mainly the government’s role. 
SWADE has taken over some of these services, as government extension officers have 
difficulties in accessing the remote areas (having limited support in terms of transport). 
The survey results indicate that cattle farmers have access to market information (Table 6.5). 
On average, 64 % and 81 % of cattle producers and cattle finishers, respectively, had access 
to market information, such as market price information, type of animals to purchase/sell type 
of buyers and quality of animals. From the results, the main sources of information were 
other farmers (including traders), butchers, extension officers (government), SMI and the 
media. 
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Table ‎6.5: Access to services 
Variables Definition Cattle Producers (%) 
n=53 
Cattle Finishers (%) 
n=36 
Access to extension 
services 
Yes 
No 
28.3 
71.7 
41.7 
58.3 
Access to market 
information 
Yes 
No 
64.2 
35.8 
80.6 
19.4 
Source of market 
information 
Government 
Traders 
Butchers 
Farmers 
TV/Radio 
SMI 
26.4 
15.1 
43.4 
75.5 
11.4 
0.0 
44.4 
11.1 
22.3 
22.3 
11.1 
16.7 
Type of market 
information 
Prices 
Type of animals 
Type of buyers 
Quality of animals 
90.6 
52.9 
56.6 
43.4 
80.6 
27.8 
47.2 
33.4 
Access to training 
services 
Yes 
No 
49.1 
50.9 
47.2 
52.8 
Type of training Record keeping 
Beef cattle marketing 
Beef cattle health 
General farm Mgt. 
Pasture/rangeland est. 
&Mgt. 
Beef cattle feeding 
9.4 
32.1 
47.2 
41.5 
37.7 
 
30.2 
33.3 
30.5 
33.3 
33.3 
33.3 
 
30.5 
 
Training is an important factor in the production and marketing of livestock in any 
developing country; however, a number of smallholder farmers are still unable to access 
training as a service. This service is mainly provided by government and non-governmental 
organisations. As shown in Table 6.5, 49 % and 47 % of cattle producers and cattle finishers, 
respectively, received training mainly on the following: record keeping, beef cattle 
marketing, beef cattle health, general farm management, pasture/rangeland establishment and 
management, and beef cattle feeding. 
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6.4.1 Farmers’‎association 
Farmers’ associations and/or groups in the LUSIP and KDDP areas are encouraged, owing to 
the fact that when in groups, a larger number of farmers benefit than do individuals. 
According to the survey results (Table 6.6), 55 % of cattle producers, 92 % of cattle finishers, 
and 64 % of cattle traders are members of an association. The main type of association that 
cattle farmers are involved in are the Sugarcane Farmers Association, Feedlot Farming 
Association, Maize Farmers Association, and Savings and Credit Cooperatives. It is evident 
from the results that the main benefit of being in an association or cooperative is that of 
improved income, access to credit, acquisition of new technologies and ideas, collective 
action, and access to piped water for farming and production. Although there is a farmers’ 
association in Swaziland, called Swaziland National Agricultural Union (SNAU), cattle 
farmers suggested that there is a need for Beef Cattle Farmers Association, if beef cattle 
production is to be commercialised. 
 
Table ‎6.6: Farmer association and membership benefits 
Variables Definition Cattle 
Producers 
(%) 
Cattle 
Finishers 
(%) 
Cattle 
Traders 
(%) 
Farmers’ association 
member 
Yes 
No 
54.7 
45.3 
91.7 
8.3 
63.6 
36.4 
Benefits of joining Improvement of Income 
Collective action 
Access to credit 
Acquisition of new technologies 
and ideas 
Accessibility to piped water 
43.4 
5.7 
11.3 
28.3 
 
43.4 
75 
2.8 
44.4 
27.8 
 
36.1 
27.3 
22.6 
27.3 
27.2 
 
18.1 
Type of association Sugarcane FA 
Feedlot A 
Maize FA 
Savings and credit cooperatives 
Investment company 
43.4 
0 
1.9 
7.5 
1.9 
36.1 
47.2 
0 
0 
16.7 
18.1 
4.5 
0 
9 
31.8 
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6.5 Summary 
The descriptive results of the study showed that most cattle farmers were males, and the 
average age was about 50 years. The results further showed that, on average, cattle farmers 
had primary school education, which is up to seven years of schooling. The major source of 
income for cattle farmers is cattle farming, and since the study was conducted under SWADE 
developmental project areas, farmers are also involved in sugarcane farming and other crop 
production activities, such as maize and vegetable production. 
The stakeholders were only involved in informal contracts, which mean that any party may 
change the terms or not abide by the contract. This may have undesirable consequences in 
terms of prices, grades and time of purchase. Most verbal contracts were between farmers and 
SMI or local butcheries. About 42 % and 28 % of cattle finishers and cattle producers had 
access to extension services, respectively. Less than half of the cattle farmers had access to 
training on beef cattle production and marketing. The majority of cattle farmers had access to 
information, such as prices, type of animals to sell, and quality of animals needed by buyers. 
It was found that a majority of the respondents were members of a farmers’ association. Most 
farmers cited benefits as being improvements in farmers’ income, access to piped water, and 
access to credit. 
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CHAPTER 7  
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 
7.1 Introduction 
Presentation of the statistical analysis of smallholder cattle farmers, finishers and traders in 
Swaziland is undertaken in this chapter. The descriptive statistics of the variables used in the 
study, access to credit and factors influencing credit availability and access to smallholder 
cattle farmers, and the factors and/or probability that a farmer will engage in a contractual 
arrangement with other actors in the value chain, are presented. 
One of the requirements when smallholder cattle producers, finishers and or traders need to 
access a loan from a formal credit institution is a document (contract) showing the supply and 
market of the product. This contract shows that a farmer will buy a certain number of cattle, 
cattle feed or medication from a certain supplier and utilise a certain marketing channel. This 
contract arrangement is required when farmers need to access a loan, and in this chapter, a 
discussion is focused on identifying and comparing factors that might be used to explain 
differences in participation in contract farming. 
 
7.2 Descriptive statistics of the variables used 
The herd size of cattle ranged from 1 animal to 74 animals per farmer, with an average of 18 
cattle (Table 7.1). The standard deviation of the average herd size is 16. From the interviewed 
cattle farmers, a minority (16%) of them were involved in cattle fattening (this was mainly 
done by cattle finishers). Almost half the population interviewed had verbal contract 
agreements of sale with other stakeholders in the beef value chain. Formal contracts are not 
used by smallholder farmers and for the beef value chain to improve this mechanism is 
encouraged. The average number of cattle sold in the market was 5 animals with a standard 
deviation of 16 animals. 
The minimum number of cattle sold was 0 with a maximum of 150, this shows that some 
cattle producers did not sell their cattle in the previous year (2013) and the maximum of 150 
animals sold was mostly by cattle fatteners who were involved in cattle fattening. The 
minimum of zero cattle sold is in line with the observation that Swazi farmers are reluctant to 
sell their cattle and the maximum of 150 cattle sold was from farmers who were operating a 
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feedlot as an income-generating project. From the farmers interviewed 38 % revealed that 
they never sold any cattle in the year 2013, while 40 % revealed that they sold less than 5 
numbers of cattle. 
As shown in Table 7.1, the average income level per month of cattle farmers from other 
businesses was 2, showing that the average income per month varies between E1 001 and 
E2 000. The income is derived from sugarcane farming dividends, vegetable, cotton and 
maize farming. Most smallholder cattle farmers in Swaziland are found on SNL, that is, 
communal land tenure. The average land or farm size allocated per farmer was 2 hectares 
(ranging from 0 ha to 15 ha). Table 7.1 shows that some farmers had no land allocated to 
them, but share land with other family members or with members of their association. A 
minority (13.2%) of the cattle farmers interviewed either share land, and this land is used for 
farming. The land is mainly used for vegetable, maize and cotton farming. During the off-
season, cattle are allowed to graze in the fields. 
Table ‎7.1: Description of variables used in the study 
Variable Mean Std. Dev. Min Max 
Farmers age (years) 48.610 13.472 21 82 
Education Level (Illiterate = 1; Literate = 2; 
Primary = 3; Secondary = 4; Tertiary = 5) 
2.650 1.235 1 5 
Income in other business per month (>E1000 = 
1; E1001-E2000 = 2; E2001-E5000 = 3; 
<E5001 = 4) 
2.090 1.395 1 4 
Association member (Yes = 1; No = 0) 0.700 0.462 0 1 
Farm size (ha/farmer) 2.140 2.998 0 15 
Herd size (number) 17.910 16.505 1 74 
Cattle sold (number) 4.990 16.895 0 150 
Cattle fattening (Yes = 1; No = 0) 0.160 0.366 0 1 
Contract arrangement (Yes = 1; No = 0) 0.440 0.499 0 1 
Market information (Yes = 1; No = 0) 0.690 0.520 0 1 
Access to training services (Yes = 1; No = 0) 0.480 0.503 0 1 
Market access (Yes = 1; No = 0) 0.620 0.489 0 1 
Access to extension services (Yes = 1; No = 0) 0.360 0.483 0 1 
Bank account (Yes = 1; No = 0) 0.790 0.412 0 1 
Loan Facility (Yes = 1; No = 0) 0.600 0.494 0 1 
Access to credit (Yes = 1; No = 0) 0.440 0.499 0 1 
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Almost all the farmers interviewed were members of a farmers’ association, taking into 
consideration that the study was conducted in SWADE development project areas where 
being a member of an association is encouraged, if not a must. 
More than half of the cattle farmers had access to markets, as well as market information. 
Access to market information was mostly provided by extension officers from the Ministry of 
Agriculture and Livestock officers from SWADE, and/or other cattle farmers. Training and 
extension services were provided to cattle farmers, but only a minority of farmers interviewed 
had access to such services. Those who received access to training found the help and 
information provided by the veterinary assistant very useful in terms of cattle marketing, 
health issues, feeding, pasture, farm management, and market information. 
Although more than half of the cattle farmers had private bank accounts and had acquired 
informal loans for farming and livestock production, access to credit from formal institutions 
was a challenge for cattle farmers, as these institutions require collateral which many 
smallholders do not possess. Less than half of the respondents had access to credit from 
banks or microfinance institutions, but money was easily available from friends and relatives. 
 
7.3 Access to credit 
Access to credit is one of the factors for successful livestock production and marketing, as 
farmers need credit to improve their investment in new and improved technologies and for 
purchasing cattle. Inability to access credit inhibits production, and hence there is a need for 
the improvement of credit availability. According to the survey results (Table 7.2), 36 % of 
cattle producers, 36 % of cattle finishers, and 50 % of cattle traders had access to credit. The 
main sources of credit were friends or relatives, banks, microfinance institutions, SMI and 
cooperatives or associations. It is observed that fewer smallholders demand credit from 
commercial banks than informal lenders (Friends/relatives, Cooperatives/associations, 
Microfinance institutions and NGO’s). This is supported by Chisasa (2014) who concluded 
that, this is because of high interest rates, long and difficult application procedures, fear of 
losing collateralised assets and high transaction costs. Cattle traders had more access to credit 
than cattle producers and finishers did. 
According to the survey results, 49 % of cattle producers, 56 % of cattle finishers, and 54 % 
of cattle traders (of the farmers that had access to credit) had access to a loan facility for 
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livestock and farming. The main source of finance was Fincorp, SIDC and Swazibank, and 
other sources used by farmers were Inhlanyelo fund, Standard Bank and First National bank. 
From the surveyed sample, 70 % of cattle producers, 92 % of cattle finishers, and 91 % of 
cattle traders had access to banking services, such as bank accounts. These accounts were 
savings, investments and transmission accounts. 
Table ‎7.2: Access to credit 
Variable Definition Cattle Producers 
(%) n=53  
Cattle Finishers 
(%) n=36 
Cattle Trader 
(%) n=22  
Access to credit Yes 
No 
35.8 
64.2 
36.1 
63.9 
50.0 
50.0 
Source of credit Friends/relatives 
Cooperatives/associations 
Banks 
Microfinance institutions 
SMI 
24.5 
13.2 
5.7 
3.8 
0.0 
16.7 
2.8 
8.4 
8.4 
8.4 
54.5 
0.0 
31.8 
31.8 
0.0 
Loan facility for 
livestock and 
farming 
Yes 
No 
49.1 
50.9 
55.6 
44.4 
54.4 
9.1 
Type of credit Cash money in advance 
Loan 
In kind product 
1.9 
47.2 
0.0 
0.0 
55.6 
33.3 
0.0 
50.0 
0.0 
Name of the 
institution 
Fincorp 
Inhlanyelo fund 
SIDC 
Standard Bank 
Swazibank 
First National Bank 
34.0 
1.9 
1.9 
3.8 
7.5 
0.0 
27.8 
5.6 
16.7 
2.8 
11.1 
2.8 
13.6 
9.1 
9.1 
4.5 
22.7 
4.5 
Bank account Yes 
No 
69.8 
30.2 
91.7 
8.3 
90.9 
9.1 
 
7.4 Factors‎influencing‎farmers’‎involvement‎in‎contract‎arrangements 
Farmers’ involvement in contract agreements with other actors in the value chain depends on 
the set of demographic and socio-characteristic factors of farmers, as indicated in Table 7.3. 
The results in Table 7.3 were obtained when the data was analysed using the contract 
agreement logit model. The model correctly explains 51 % of the variation in the dependent 
variable (contract agreement) and explanatory variables, as evidence of the Nagelkerke R 
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square. The Nagelkerke R square indicates a moderately strong relationship of 51 % between 
contract agreement and the independent variables, relating a good fit of the model to the data. 
Overall, a majority of the respondents (58 %) were not engaged in contract agreements. 
Logistic regression analysis was employed to predict the probability that a respondent would 
agree to be involved in a contract agreement with other value chain actors. A test of the full 
model versus a model with intercept only was statistically significant at 1 %, with 10 degrees 
of freedom and ᵪ2 = 39.932. This means that the model with the variables is better compared 
to the one with the constant only. The model is able correctly to classify 66 % of those who 
are involved in contract agreements with other stakeholders in the value chain and 75 % of 
those who did not, for an overall correctly predicted estimated model rate of 71 % sample 
cases. 
The results of the logit model, although some coefficients are not significant, indicate that 
participation in contract agreement by a farmer is positively influenced by gender of the 
farmer, off-farm income, access to market, marketing information, extension services, loan 
facility from a bank for agricultural production, and being a member of a farmers’ 
association. Participation in contracts is negatively influenced by access to credit, age of the 
farmer and having a bank account. With the exception of having a bank account, the other 
coefficients all have the expected signs. 
A majority of the variables were significantly associated with farmers’ involvement in 
contract agreement with other actors in the value chain. Three variables – bank account, loan 
facility for agricultural production, and gender of the farmer – were not statistically 
significant. Age and off-farm income were significant at the 10 % level, and access to credit, 
marketing information, extension services and member of a farmers’ association were 
significant at the 5 % level, while access to market was significant at 1 % level. This shows 
that access to market provides a greater opportunity for farmers to become involved in 
contractual agreements mostly with buyers, as this will guarantee a market for their product. 
A farmer who has access to formal credit is 0.05 times less likely to enter into a contract 
agreement with either input suppliers and or output buyers, when holding all other variables 
constant. Stated in another way, for every one-unit increase in farmers’ access to credit, we 
expect a 2.9 decrease in the log-odds of a farmer to participate in contract farming. The result 
is similar to studies by Costales et al. (2007); Sharma, (2008) and Tongchure and Hoang 
(2013) where in their studies the logic was that producers with relatively more constrained 
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access to credit were more likely to participate in informal or formal agreements with 
intermediaries in order to benefit from the contracting firm . This contradicts the findings of 
Swain (2012) and Mwambi et al. (2013), suggesting that farmers with access to formal credit 
are willing to participate in contract farming because they are able to purchase farm inputs, as 
well as pay for proper storage and transport facilities which are requirements usually needed 
by contractors before entering into contract.  
Table ‎7.3:‎Factors‎influencing‎farmers’‎involvement‎in‎contract‎agreements 
Variable B 
(coefficient) 
Wald x2 P (p-value) Odds Ratio 
Age -0.039
* 
2.734 0.098 0.962 
Gender 0.933 1.551 0.213 2.543 
Off-farm Income (OI) 0.483
* 
3.698 0.054 1.620 
Access to credit (Cr) -2.947
** 
4.478 0.034 0.052 
Access to market (AM) 2.770
***
 11.783 0.001 15.955 
Access Marketing information (AMI)   0.503
** 
4.975 0.026 1.654 
Extension 
Bank Account (BA) 
Loan Facility (LF) 
Association Member (FA) 
1.482
** 
-1.835 
2.007 
2.576
** 
4.058 
2.599 
1.942 
5.658 
0.044 
0.107 
0.163 
0.017 
4.404 
0.160 
7.441 
13.142 
Constant -3.914
**
 5.418 0.020 0.021 
*,**,***Statistically significant at 10 %, 5 % and 1 %respectively. R2 = 51 % and correct prediction = 71 % 
Explaining the results using the odds ratio, it can be said that an older farmer is 1.0 times less 
likely to participate in contract farming. This finding is in line with a study by Sharma (2008) 
and Musara et al. (2011), who stated that the negative sign for the age variable might be due 
to the negative correlation between age and adoption decision for most technologies in 
dynamic economic environments. That is, younger farmers tend to be more willing to adopt 
new technologies than their older counterparts are. As stated earlier, older farmers tend to be 
risk-averse and may avoid contract farming in an attempt to avoid risks associated with the 
initiative. This result is contrary to findings by Costales et al. (2007), who found that older 
farmers are more likely to participate in contract farming. 
Access to market was identified to have a positive and significant effect on farmers’ 
involvement in contract agreements, implying that when a farmer has access to markets, it is 
more probable that he or she will be involved in a contract agreement. The variable has the 
largest marginal effect on a farmers’ involvement in contractual agreement.  A farmer with 
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market access is 16 times more likely to be involved in contractual agreement than the one 
who has no market access. Access to markets enables a farmer to obtain relevant and current 
information about prices, grades, weights and buyers. In the contract, these actors are able to 
agree on prices and different grades for cattle, allowing for information symmetry. 
A farmer who is a member of a farmers’ association is 13 times more likely to participate in 
contract farming than the one who is not a member of an association. This variable has the 
second-largest marginal effect in contract participation. An explanation may be that, if 
farmers are members of a farmers’ association, they are able to pool their resources 
(production inputs and supplying the market), have more bargaining power, and also reduce 
the transaction costs of agribusiness firms. This will then decrease the chances of contractors 
preferring large-scale farmers in favour of smallholder farmers. Moreover, when a farmer is 
member of a cooperative, he or she has verbal, and sometimes written, agreements with the 
Cooperative in terms of product supply, prices, quality, inputs use, etc. This finding is in line 
with the results by Sharma (2008) and Tongchure and Hoang (2013) that farmers in farmers’ 
or agricultural associations will participate in contract farming. 
The odds ratio for off-farm income indicates that, when holding all other variables constant, a 
farmer with off-farm income is 1.6 times more likely to become involved in contractual 
agreements with buyers of cattle and input providers. These findings vindicate studies by 
Sharma (2008), Wainaina et al. (2012) and Swain (2012), who found that having other 
sources of income will increase the chances of farmers’ participating in contract farming. On 
the contrary, Catelo and Costales (2014) and Musara et al. (2011) stated that when 
smallholder farmers have higher levels of off-farm and non-farm income, the farmers are less 
likely to participate in contract farming because they have enough to finance their farming 
activities and still remain with enough for contingencies. 
Similarly, the odds ratio for marketing information indicates that a farmer with access to 
market information is 1.65 times more likely to have access to marketing information for 
their product when they participate in contract farming than a farmer with no access to 
market information.  
Furthermore, a farmer who receives extension services from the government and NGOs is 4.4 
times more likely to become involved in contract agreement than a farmer with no access to 
extension services at all.  The results are in line with the study by Wainaina et al. (2012) in 
terms of significance, but contrary in the sense that their extension variable was negative, 
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implying that farmers who obtain technical advice from government extension agents or 
NGOs are likely to be more aware and informed of alternative marketing channels and also 
production methods, and thus are less likely to participate in contract farming. 
 
7.5 Factors‎influencing‎farmers’‎access‎to‎formal‎credit 
Farmers’ access to credit from formal financial institutions depends on the set of 
demographic and socio-characteristic factors of farmers, as indicated in Table 7.4. 
Table 7.4 presents the results of the logit regression model. The model’s explained variation 
in the dependent variable (access to credit) is 26.2 % as evidence of the Nagelkerke R square. 
The Nagelkerke R square indicates that the explanatory variables explains about 26 % of the 
variance in access to credit, suggesting a modest fit of the model to the data. Since the data 
was analysed using a logistic regression model, the goodness of fit will be better tested with a 
ᵪ2 statistic due to non-linearity of the model. Overall, a majority of respondents (56 %) had no 
access to credit. Logistic regression analysis was employed to predict the probability that a 
respondent would have access to credit. The predictor variables are as described above. A test 
of the full model versus a model with intercept only was statistically significant at 1 %, ᵪ2 = 
19.35 and 8 degrees of freedom, meaning the model with the variables is better than when the 
model only has the intercept. The model was able to correctly classify 59 % of those who had 
access to credit and 82 % of those who did not, for an overall correctly predicted estimated 
model rate of 72 % sample cases. 
Table 7.4 shows the logistic regression coefficient (column B), Wald test, p-value and odds 
ratio for each of the variables/predictors. The odds ratio can be calculated in SPSS, it actually 
calculates this value of the In(odds ratio); these values are reported in the column Odds Ratio 
in Table 7.4.Employing a 0.05 criterion of statistical significance, herd size, age and training 
variables had significant partial effects on access to credit from formal financial institutions. 
Further, employing the 0.1 criterion of statistical significance, only income had significant 
partial effects, while the other variables (farm size, contract agreement, cattle fattening and 
market information) were not significant, even at 0.1 criterion. 
The result corresponds with the a priori expectation, except the negative effect of marketing 
information and being involved in cattle fattening. These two variables were not significant 
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for farmers’ access to credit. The non-significance of contract agreement was also not 
expected, although it was positive.  
For herd size, which was significant at 5 % level, a farmer with a larger herd size is 0.95 
times less likely to access credit from a financial institution than a farmer with less herd size. 
The prediction was that the larger the herd size, the less likely a farmer would be willing to 
access credit from a financial institution as they can easily convert cattle into cash. Yehuala 
(2008) stated that, as the total number of animals in the household increases, the household 
would be less likely to go for credit, as they can also be easily converted into cash when 
demand arises. This can be attributed to increases in wealth and income base of farm 
households, which renders more money available in the households. 
Age was significant at 5 % level and yielded positive results. The odds ratio for age indicates 
that, holding all other variables constant, an older farmer is 1.05 times more likely to gain 
access to credit from a financial institution than is a younger farmer.  The result on age is 
similar to the finding by Mohamed (2003) which reveals age as being one of the five socio-
economic factors that were found to influence smallholders’ access to credit from formal and 
quasi-formal credit institutions. Chauke et al. (2013) stated that farmers’ attitude towards 
risks will affect access to credit from a formal institution; generally it is perceived that older 
farmers are risk-averse and that young farmers are risk takers, thus credit institutions will 
provide credit to risk averters and less risky businesses. 
Similarly, training has a positive effect on the access to credit, because this shows that the 
farmer has knowledge of the business and the chances of failure are less. At 5 % level of 
significance, the results show that trained farmers have higher probabilities of accessing 
credit. A farmer with training in beef cattle production and marketing is 3 times more likely 
to gain access to credit than is a farmer with no training. This finding vindicates studies 
conducted elsewhere, such as Mohamed (2003), and Etonihu et al. (2013). This may be 
attributable to the fact that educated and formally trained farmers have a better understanding 
of banking procedures and rules for acquiring and using formal banking financial product and 
services, and also attain high production in their farming activities. 
Further, income yielded a positive result, but was significant at the 10 % level. Predictions 
stated earlier were that if a farmer has some sort of income from other businesses, there are 
higher chances that a financial provider will provide a loan for other endeavours. A farmer 
who receives income per month from other businesses is 1.4 times more likely to receive 
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credit from a financial institution than is a farmer with no income at all. This finding 
vindicates a study finding by Muhongayirea et al. (2013) in rural Rwanda that off-farm 
income has significant influence in farmers’ participation in the credit market. This finding, 
therefore, implies that poor farmers might be excluded from accessing formal credit, perhaps 
because they lack appropriate collateral. 
Table ‎7.4:‎Factors‎influencing‎farmers’‎access‎to‎formal‎credit 
Variable B 
(coefficient) 
Wald x2 P (p-value) Odds Ratio 
Herd size (Hsize) -0.048
**
 5.904 0.015 0.954 
Age 0.045
**
 5.019 0.025 1.046 
Training 1.144
**
 4.725 0.030 3.140 
Farm size (Fsize) 0.070 0.613 0.434 1.073 
Off-farm Income (OI) 0.335
*
 3.208 0.073 1.397 
Contractual agreement (CA) 0.634 1.373 0.241 1.885 
Access Marketing information (AMI) 
Cattle fattening (CF) 
Constant 
-0.122 
-0.634 
-2.931
**
 
0.520 
0.716 
6.479 
0.241 
0.397 
0.011 
0.885 
0.530 
0.053 
*, **,***statistically significant at 10 %, 5 % and 1 % respectively. R2 = 26 % and correct prediction = 72 % 
 
These results suggest that the significant factors affecting farmers’ access to credit include 
herd size, age, training and income received from other businesses. It is therefore probable 
that herd size, in combination with income from other businesses, age and training and/or 
knowledge on farm business and accounts, plays a distinctive role in gaining access to credit 
by the farmer. If the business plan of the farmer is good and viable, lack of income in other 
businesses may be a factor which may be insignificant with time. 
 
7.6 Contract participation in improving access to credit 
The assumption was that having a contractual agreement with other actors in the value chain 
will enhance or improve access to credit from formal financial institution for smallholder 
farmers. Research has shown that contract participation provides benefits to the contracted 
farmer, which includes amongst other things access to credit (Hudson, 2000; Costales et al., 
2007; Tongchure and Hoang, 2013; FAO, 2013). Sharma (2008) and Tongchure and Hoang 
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(2013) concluded that farmers use the contracts as collateral in order to access credit from 
formal financial institutions, thus encouraging farmers to participate in contract farming, as 
they will be less dependent on informal sources, mainly money lenders, for credit 
requirements. 
Many smallholders are credit constrained as this study shows and other studies that have been 
reviewed in the literature. Hence they do not have access to farm inputs needed to improve 
the production and productivity of their enterprises. Agribusiness firms usually include 
forward payment or provision of inputs in contracts to overcome this problem (Simmons, 
2002). Many studies have shown that contract farming offers clear opportunities for 
smallholders. Contracts enable farmers to have access to a reliable market, it provides 
guaranteed and fixed pricing structures and most importantly, it provides access to credit, 
inputs and production services (Little and Watts, 1994; Hudson, 2000; Singh, 2002; 
Simmons, 2002; Bijman, 2008). 
In the model of factors affecting contract participation, the variable access to credit was 
significant but negative. This shows a negative relationship between access to credit and 
contract participation, meaning contract participation is negatively determined by access to 
credit from formal financial institution. The interpretation is that, a farmer who has access to 
credit from formal financial institution is less likely to participate in informal contract or 
formal contract. This is because farmers mostly participate in contract farming in order to 
benefit from contract farming, which is, having access to credit, markets, inputs and 
production services. Studies (Hudson, 2000; Singh, 2002; Simmons, 2002) have emphasised 
that farmers engage in contract in order to benefit from those contracts in terms of input 
services, but if a farmer already has access to credit there is no need for that farmer to 
participate in the contract. This is because they can simply use the money they have borrowed 
from the financial institution to improve their enterprises, operational cost and accessing the 
market. 
In the model of factors affecting access to credit, the variable of contract agreement was 
positive but not statistically significant. The positive variable indicates that contractual 
agreement will increase the probability for a farmer to access credit from a formal financial 
institution. The insignificance of the variable, contract agreement in this model was not 
expected. This then contradict results of previous studies (Hudson, 2000; Singh, 2002; 
Simmons, 2002; Bijman, 2008). Da Silva (2005), in a study of, the growing role of contract 
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farming in agri-food systems development: drivers, the researcher found that access to credit 
is enhanced under provision of a contract. The credit may be supplied in kind (input 
provision) by the contracting firm and/or the banking system. The banks also accept the 
contractual commitment as it provides a sufficient guarantee for the loan.   
The author is not able to establish the cause of this relationship between contract participation 
and access to credit in the study. This is because previous studies show a positive and 
significant relationship between the two. But the following explanations are forwarded by the 
author, that most of the smallholders had access to informal finance (demanded credit from 
Friends/relatives, Cooperatives/associations, Microfinance institutions) therefore they do not 
require smallholders to participate in contract in order to give out loans or credit. The current 
study only dealt with smallholders with informal contracts (not legally binding) therefore 
they do not provide a sufficient guarantee for a loan in a formal financial institution. 
Previous studies (Simmons, 2002; Wooded, 2003; Bijman, 2008) were mostly investigating 
the benefits of contract farming, advantages of contract farming and/or why smallholders 
engage in contract while the current study was investigating the role of contracts in 
improving or enhancing access to credit for smallholder farmers. Therefore the current study 
was specific to contract and access to credit only not other benefits or advantages of 
contracting. The study was also specific to access of credit from formal financial institution 
while previous studies (Singh, 2002; Ruben et al., 2007; Catelo and Costales, 2014), the 
results were from investigation of access to credit from contracting firms 
 
7.7 Summary 
It can be gathered from both the descriptive and empirical analyses that farmers in SNL who 
are involved in beef cattle farming are rarely involved in formal contract agreements. They 
are mostly involved in informal contracts or verbal agreements which may not be as legally 
enforceable as a formal or written contract. From the empirical results, the probability that 
smallholder farmers will participate in formal contract farming is positively and significantly 
influenced by off-farm income, better access to extension services, being a member of a 
farmers’ association, having access to assured market, and access to marketing information. 
Factors that negatively and significantly influence chances of a farmer to be involved in 
contract agreement willingly are age of the farmer, and having access to formal credit from a 
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financial institution. Variables which had no significance but positive influence in contract 
farming were gender of the farmer and having a loan facility from a financial institution for 
agricultural production, while having a bank account had a negative influence on a farmer 
participating in contract farming. The non-significance of these variables implied that gender, 
having a loan, and having a bank account were not effective in contract participation. 
Access to credit by smallholder cattle farmers in Swaziland is low, but can be positively and 
significantly influenced by a farmer’s income which is received from other business 
activities, the age of the farmer (meaning the older the farmer is, the higher the chances are 
that a financial provider might offer credit) and training either formally or informal, that is, 
training in good husbandry practices, record keeping, and overall farm management. Access 
to credit is negatively but significantly influenced by herd size, implying that farmers with 
larger herd sizes will be less likely to want to access credit, as they may easily convert cattle 
into cash, thus having enough to finance their farming activities and still remain with enough 
for contingencies. 
Although not significant, access to credit was positively influenced by farm size and contract 
agreement. The non-significance of these variables implies that having land, more especially 
on SNL where smallholder farmers are located, has no effect on smallholders’ access to 
credit, as this cannot be treated as collateral because the land has no title since it is land held 
in trust for the Swazi nation by the Swazi king. Similarly, the interviewed farmers were 
mostly involved in informal contracts or verbal agreements, which a formal institution may 
not recognise as legally binding for farmers to access a loan. Access to marketing information 
and being involved in cattle fattening affected access to credit negatively, but were not 
significant, implying that having information on markets and being involved in cattle 
fattening were not effective or sufficient for a farmer to gain access to credit. 
From the empirical results of factors influencing farmers’ involvement in contract agreement, 
access to formal credit was significant but negative. The conclusion is that farmers who have 
access to formal credit are less likely to participate in contract farming, as they will be able to 
finance their farming activities. This means that farmers participate in contract farming in 
order to gain access to a wide range of services, including access to credit, and research have 
indicated that the contracts may be used as collateral when farmers need to obtain credit from 
formal financial institutions. Having a contract may enable a smallholder farmer to have 
access to credit from the contracting firm to buy production inputs and invest in new 
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technologies thus improving production and productivity. From the results of the factors that 
affect access to credit where the variable contract agreement was not significant, the study 
concludes that participation in contracts does not lead to improvement in access to credit for 
smallholder farmers from formal financial institutions. This unexpected finding emanates 
from the fact that the respondents that were interviewed were mostly involved in informal 
contract agreements which may not be considered by formal financial institutions as 
collateral. 
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CHAPTER 8  
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
8.1 Introduction 
This chapter provides a summary and the conclusion of the study. It also provides some 
recommendations arising from the study. The chapter is structured into six sections. After the 
introduction, aim of the study and methods and procedures are presented in the second and 
third section, respectively. Findings of the study are presented in the fourth section. The fifth 
section presents the conclusions, and the last section makes recommendation on how to 
improve credit access through contracts, on policy and future research. 
 
8.2 Aim of the study 
The aim of this study was to investigate the role of contracts in promoting access to credit for 
smallholder cattle farmers, cattle fatteners and traders in Swaziland. Specifically, the study 
determined the credit access status of smallholder cattle farmers, fatteners and traders, 
identified factors that determine smallholder cattle farmers’, fatteners’ and traders’ access to 
credit from formal financial institutions and further determined whether participating in 
contracts leads to improved access to credit. In addition, the study also determined factors 
that may lead cattle farmers to become involved in contract agreements with other actors in 
the value chain. 
 
8.3 Methods and procedures 
A sample of 111cattle farmers (53 cattle producers, 36 cattle finishers and 22 cattle traders) 
was randomly selected and interviewed, using a face-to-face questionnaire. Data on farmers’ 
access to finance, socio-economic characteristics, and participation in contractual agreements 
were collected and analysed. Both descriptive and econometric analyses were performed. 
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8.4 Findings 
Cattle farmers keep cattle for a wide range of services. The principal contribution of cattle to 
rural households is the provision of family income. During focus group discussions, farmers 
revealed that keeping cattle is traditionally not only as a source of family income, but also for 
indicating social status (prestige), lobola (dowry), draught power for crop farming, and the 
provision of food consumption items, such as milk and meat (during celebrations and 
funerals). They also provide sources of employment in rural areas. Cattle farmers differ in 
terms of their operations, that is, operating as cattle producers, cattle finishers and cattle 
traders. 
 
8.4.1 Characteristics of respondents 
The results from this study showed that most cattle farmers were males, that is, 72 % of 
producers, 56 % of finishers, and 91 % of traders. The average age was 50.3 years for 
producers, 45.4 years for finishers, and 51.3 years for traders. The results further showed that, 
on average, cattle farmers had received primary school education, which is up to seven years 
of schooling. 
As stated above, the major source of income for cattle farmers is cattle farming. Since the 
study was conducted in SWADE developmental project areas, farmers are also involved in 
sugarcane farming and other crop production activities, such as maize and vegetable 
production. The average range of gross income in other businesses which cattle farmers were 
involved in ranged between E2 001 and E5 000 per month. 
The descriptive analysis also revealed that 38 % of cattle producers, 53 % of cattle finishers, 
and 46 % of cattle traders are engaged in verbal purchasing contracts. During focus group 
discussions, it was revealed that cattle farmers were only involved in informal contracts, and 
not formal ones, which means that any party may change the terms or not abide by the 
contract. This may have undesirable consequences in terms of prices, grades and time of 
purchase. Most verbal contracts were either with SMI or local butcheries. When farmers were 
asked if they would like to be involved in formal contracts, 66 % of cattle producers, 81 % of 
cattle finishers, and 73 % of cattle traders revealed that they would like to be involved in 
formal contracts with the relevant actors in the beef value chain. The reasons cited were 
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access to finance, guaranteed markets, access to production inputs, and access to market 
information. 
It was found that a majority of the respondents were members of farmers’ association (55 % 
for producers, 92 % for finishers, and 64 % for traders). Farmers who were members of a 
farmers’ association cited the following benefits: improvements in farmers’ income, access to 
piped water, and access to credit (mostly for those involved in feedlotting). 
 
8.4.2 Factors that determine participation in contracts 
The logistic regression model predicted that 58 % of the respondents were not involved in 
contract arrangements with other value chain actors. The results of the logistic regression 
model on factors that determine participation in contracts revealed that cattle farmers are 
positively and significantly influenced by off-farm income, better access to extension 
services, being a member of a farmers’ association, having access to assured market, and 
access to marketing information in order for them to engage in contract arrangements with 
other actors in the value chain. Participation in contract farming by smallholder farmers was 
further influenced negatively and significantly by age of the farmer and having access to 
formal credit. 
Contract farming, or having a contract, has an impact on a smallholder cattle farmer by 
improving the chances for them to have access to formal credit and other inputs and services 
that are necessary for production and marketing of beef cattle in Swaziland. 
 
8.4.3 Factors affecting access to credit 
As it is the case in other developing countries, access to funding for smallholder cattle actors 
in Swaziland is mainly realised through ‘informal’ channels. Relatives and friends represent 
the major source for such funding. This is a missed opportunity for formal credit providers, 
whose regulations and prerequisites are too strict for attracting this category of borrowers. 
The magnitude of access to credit showed that 64 % of cattle producers and fatteners had no 
access to credit, while half of the traders interviewed had access. The mostly utilised source 
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of credit was friends and relatives. The logistic regression model predicted that 56 % of the 
respondents had no access to credit from formal institutions. 
The results of the logistic regression model on farmers’ access to credit revealed that formal 
credit providers would provide finance to cattle farmers if they have relevant training on 
livestock production and marketing, and have access to income from other business activities 
that they are involved in. They also consider the numbers of livestock owned and the age of 
the cattle farmer. 
8.4.4 Contractual agreement in improving access to credit 
In this study contractual agreement was in the form of informal contractual agreements, that 
is, having a verbal contract with traders to buy cattle from the farmer or with SMI to buy 
cattle and provide feed on credit. Thus smallholder farmers that were interviewed were 
mostly involved in informal or verbal contract agreements.  
Access to credit negatively affects farmers to engage in contractual agreement as evidence of 
the contract agreement model. Further exploring the access to credit model, the results 
revealed that contract agreement does not determine access to credit. This means that being 
involved in contractual agreement, in this case informal contracts, does not lead to 
improvement in access to credit for smallholder farmers from formal financial institution. 
 
8.5 Conclusion 
This study has shown that, despite the high proportion of farmers who have private bank 
accounts, access to credit is still limited among cattle producers and cattle fatteners, and half 
of cattle traders have never contracted a loan from a financial institution. This is mainly 
attributable to farmers’ lack of collateral which is required by the banks and microfinance 
institutions. In Swaziland, the majority of smallholder farmers practise subsistence farming 
on SNL which is held in trust for the Swazi Nation by the King, and thus they lack the title 
deeds that might be used as collateral. 
This study has concentrated on contract farming as an institutional arrangement for 
improving or enhancing access to formal credit from formal financial institutions for 
smallholder cattle farmers involved in beef cattle production. Contract farming is expected to 
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enable smallholder farmers to access better quality inputs, such as seeds, fertilisers, 
pesticides, extension services, and more especially credit from the commercial sector. 
Contract farming has also the potential to reduce the market, price and production risks which 
farmers face. However, it all depends on the nature of contracts, legislation for regulation of 
contract farming, enforcement, the role of government, dispute resolution mechanisms, etc. 
 
8.5.1 Contract participation 
This study has shown that participation in contract farming by smallholder farmers was 
affected by off-farm income, access to assured markets, marketing information, extension 
services, age of the farmer, being a member of farmers’ association, and access to credit. 
There is a need to assist farmers to receive better education, gain access to timely and quality 
inputs such as extension services, markets, and institutional/formal credit, and receive better 
opportunities for off-farm income to improve financial status. There is a need to promote 
non-political farmers’ organisations to improve smallholders’ bargaining power, as well as 
reduce transaction costs with agribusiness companies. 
The conclusion drawn from above is that, while participation in contractual agreements is 
significantly influenced by off-farm income, access to assured market, marketing 
information, extension services, age of the farmer, being a member of a farmers’ association 
and access to credit, there is at present limited potential for implementing successful contracts 
because of the lack of appropriate institutional arrangements and incentives to support such 
innovations. Some of these incentives include the provision of adequate numbers of 
diversified markets and marketing channels, and subsidised cattle feed and veterinary 
medication prices. The study has shown that gaining access to credit is an important reason 
for participating in contractual arrangements and that participating in these contracts 
improves access to credit. 
 
8.5.2 Access to credit 
This study has also shown that access to credit from formal institutions was affected by herd 
size, age of the farmer, training of farmers, and income derived from other business activities. 
From the government perspective, improving farmers’ skills through training and capacity 
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building in topics related to animal feeding, and the use of alternative non-grain feeding 
systems is an important issue. The availability of irrigation in specific areas of the country 
would allow farmers to gain access to fodder and crop residues (such as sugarcane tops) with 
very low costs. Animal health issues and market information are also of crucial importance 
for cattle producers and fatteners. 
The study concludes that, while access to credit maybe affected by herd size, age of farmer, 
training and being involved in other income generating projects, there is at present limitation 
in accessing credit attributable to the strict requirements for accessing loans and the limited 
regulation of formal financial institutions’ interest rates by the Central Bank of Swaziland. 
The physical absence of regulatory enforcement in the financial market seriously militates 
against farmers’ chances of accessing credit from formal institutions. 
 
8.5.3 Contract participation in improving access to credit 
The study has revealed through the contract participation model that having access to credit is 
essential in integrating smallholder cattle farmers into the overall economy, in that financial 
institution either formal or informal provide seasonal credit to farmers, thus enabling them to 
invest in new and/or improved agricultural enterprises and technologies. This study has 
shown that smallholder farmers have credit constraints but if they have access to credit from 
formal financial institution there is no need for farmers to be involved in contractual 
agreements. Credit access enables them to access credit for working or fixed capital, 
operational costs and access to markets for improve agricultural production and productivity. 
In the model, access to credit where the variable contract agreement was not significant the 
conclusion is that participation in contracts does not lead to improvement in access to credit 
from formal financial institution. This is because contract agreements were in the form of 
informal contractual agreement, therefore informal contractual agreement thus do not play an 
important role in improving access to credit of smallholder farmers from formal financial 
institutions. This is because informal contracts do not address the loan collateral problem 
and/or strengthen the creditability of future cash flows for loan repayments. 
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8.6 Recommendations 
Based on the results of this study and the conclusions drawn above, the following are 
recommended: 
 
8.6.1 Policy recommendations 
 Participation of smallholder cattle farmers in formal contracts should be enhanced 
The study found that smallholder livestock farmers in study area only engage in informal 
contracts which may not be recognised by formal institutions for granting credit.  Therefore, 
efforts should be made to encourage smallholder livestock producers to participate in formal 
contracts and this can be achieved through the promotion of access to markets and marketing 
information, promoting farmers’ involvement in farmers’ association, enhancing access to 
extension services and promoting access to credit through contract farming. 
The Government of Swaziland, through the MOA and NGOs responsible for the 
improvement and commercialisation of cattle farming in Swaziland, should prioritise and 
sequence reforms, such as contract farming and investments in the livestock industry, 
including infrastructural development in order to unleash the growth potential of the industry. 
In doing so, it is important that the policies to promote diversification, credit lending and 
farmers’ training be brought together within a coherent strategy, rather than being 
implemented as a series of ad-hoc interventions. 
There is need for government to put incentives in place that will encourage cattle farmers to 
become involved in contractual agreements through the provision of adequate numbers of 
diversified markets and marketing channels, and subsidised cattle feed prices and veterinary 
medication. From the study, it was observed that farmers were mostly involved in verbal or 
informal contracts, and thus there is a need to formalise the mechanisms so that farmers are 
able to commercialise their production. 
The study, however, argues that these policy recommendations create the necessary 
conditions to support the existing regulatory policy framework on financial markets and 
vertical coordination in Swaziland. It further acknowledges that the mere implementation of 
formal voluntary contract agreements and financial instruments for farmer lending will not 
necessarily combat the problem of lack of vertical coordination and the financial exclusion of 
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farmers in total. The best overall results are to be expected when existing policy instruments 
in a policy-mix approach are implemented together with the recommended initiatives. 
 
 Access to credit for smallholder cattle farmers should be enhanced 
The study found that smallholder cattle farmers have low access to credit from financial 
institutions. Access to credit from formal institutions, could be enhanced by encouraging beef 
cattle farmers to diversify their economic activities, thus receiving income from other 
businesses, and the provision of producer training (and trader training) on marketing and 
production activities is highly encouraged. 
The success of smallholder beef cattle farming depends on access to credit (for acquisition of 
inputs), institutional support, improvement in government policies, and socio-economic 
initiatives. The innovative beef value chain development scheme is one of the support 
programmes supported by government and other stakeholders to help motivate individual 
farmers and strengthen the beef value chain for better promotion of production and 
productivity of smallholder farmers. However, there is still a need for support programmes, 
such as a more supportive policy environment to reduce the obstacles inhibiting the effective 
access to financial and credit services, and to produce a conducive environment for 
contractual agreements, infrastructure development (cattle sales yards), improvement of 
markets and dynamic opportunities for smallholder beef cattle development in Swaziland. 
There is need for government to put incentives in place that will encourage formal financial 
institutions to make credit available so that cattle farmers might have access to credit through 
the provision of adequate numbers of diversified credit markets and credit marketing 
channels, subsidised loans and/or guaranteed loans. As previously stated, farmers mostly 
gained access to credit from informal institutions or microfinance institutions, and thus there 
is a need to formalise and increase the loan amounts so that farmers are able to commercialise 
their production. 
 
8.6.2 Recommendations for future research 
The study findings are specifically relevant to SWADE developmental areas in the Lowveld 
ecological zone of the country, which may not be representative of beef cattle production and 
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marketing in terms of gaining access to credit. Therefore, it is suggested that a similar study 
be undertaken in all other areas. 
The non-significance of the contract agreement variable in the access to credit model may 
emanate from the fact that smallholder farmers interviewed in the study were only involved 
in informal contractual agreement or verbal contracts. This indicates the need to predict by 
statistical analysis, for example the propensity score matching analysis to investigate the 
casual effect of contract participation in improving access to credit for smallholder farmers 
from formal financial institution from formal contract participants and non-contract 
participants. 
Another alternative is to conduct in the future a study that involves both smallholders with 
formal contractual agreements which are legally binding, and smallholders with informal 
agreements, and compare the results from both groups in terms of access to credit from 
financial institutions. Formal contract may be used by smallholder farmers as collateral 
during loan application from formal financial institutions.  
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APPENDIX A 
INNOVATIVE BEEF VALUE CHAIN DEVELOPMENT SCHEMES IN SOUTHERN 
AFRICA 
ILRI-IFAD-MOA-SWADE 
Cattle Producers -Finishers’‎Survey 
1. Producer identification 
1.1. Name___________________________   1.2. Gender [1=male; 2= female] ______ 
1.3. Age__________________ 1.4. Educational Level ___________ 
[1= illiterate; 2=literate; 3=primary; 4=secondary; 
5=college; 6=university] 
1.5. Cell phone number:________ 1.6. Year when you started working as cattle 
producer________ 
1.7. Is cattle producing your main business activity? [1=yes; 2= no]_______ 
1.8. Are you involved in other business activities? [1=yes; 2= no]_______ 
1.8.1. If yes, specify: ________________________________________________________ 
1.9. Indicate the level of gross income per month that you make in the other business activity: 
code__  
[1= Less than E1 000; 2=E1 001 – E2 000; 3=E2 001 – E5 000; 4=Over E5 000] 
1.10. Which of the following business activities do you engage in (getting money from these 
activities)? (Tick as many) 
Cropping [   ]   Livestock production [   ]  Livestock transport [   ] 
Livestock fattening [   ]  Slaughtering [   ]  Meat processing [   ] 
Meat retailing [   ]  Feed services [   ]   Breeding services [   ] 
Credit services [   ] Veterinary and animal health services [   ] other (specify) 
[____________] 
1.11. Specify and rank the main type (as share of income) of livestock production you are 
concerned with: (1
st
 = most important) 
1
st
 [_____]            2
nd
 [_____]            3
rd
 [_____]  [1=cattle; 2=pig; 3=sheep; 4=goats; 
5=poultry; 6=other (specify___)] 
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1.12. Do you belong to an association or a formal group of farmers? [1=yes; 2= no]_______ 
1.12.1. If yes, what’s the name of the association? _______________________ 
1.12.2. If yes, when have you joined the association? _______________________ 
1.12.3. What are the main benefits of joining it? ___________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
2. Farming and livestock inventory 
2.1. Agricultural plots 
Plot 
No. 
Locatio
n 
(code a) 
Size 
(Ha) 
Ownership 
(code b) 
Production type 
(code c) 
Water 
source 
(code d) 
Cattle 
standing on 
the land 
(code e) 
1       
2       
3       
4       
5       
6       
 
Codes 
Location 
(code a) 
Ownership 
(code b) 
Production 
type (code c) 
Water source 
(code d) 
Cattle standing 
(code e) 
1 =Sihoye 
2 = 
Madlenya 
3 = 
Siphofaneni 
4 = Gamula 
5=Lubuli 
6 = 
Ndzevane 
7= 
Mangweni 
8 = 
Sithobela 
9 = 
Tshaneni 
10= Other 
(specif
y)     
1 = Owned 
2 = Rented in 
3 = Rented out 
4 = Shared in 
5 = Shared out 
6 = Communal 
area 
7 = Other 
(specify)     
1 = Food crops 
2 = Fodder 
crops 
3 = Pasture 
4 = Sugar cane 
5 = Vegetables 
6 = Fruits 
7 = Other 
(specify)     
1 = 
River/streams 
2 = Dams 
3 = Piped 
water 
4 = Borehole 
5 = Other 
(specify)  
1 = No 
2 = All year 
around 
3 = Short periods 
of the year 
4 = Other 
(specify)  
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2.2. Number and type of cattle owned or managed 
Age category Males Females 
Total 
1 2 3 1 2 3 
age ≤6 months            
6 months < age ≤ 
2years     
       
2 years < age ≤ 4years            
4years< age        
 
Codes 
1 = Owned and managed by the HH ; 2 = Owned but not managed by the HH ; 3 = 
Managed but not owned by the HH 
2.3. Specify and rank the main type of cattle production systems used: (1
st
 = most 
important) 
1
st
 [_____]            2
nd
 [_____]            3
rd
 [_____]  [1=zero grazing; 2=grazing; 3=mixed] 
2.4. Type of grazing (tick as many) 
Communal [   ]      Private [   ]  Rangeland [   ] Zero [   ] 
2.5. Specify and rank the main type of feed used for cattle production: (1
st
 = most 
important) 
1
st
 [_____]            2
nd
 [_____]            3
rd
 [_____]         4
th
 [_____] 
[1=pasture; 2=crops residues; 3= Sugarcane residues; 4=Hay; 5=conserved fodder; 
6=industrial feed; 7=other (specify______)] 
3. Cattle trading 
3.1. Specify and rank your main cattle customers/buyers? 
1
st
 [_____]             2
nd
 [_____]             3
rd
 [_____]  4
th
 [_____]  
[1=SMI; 2=Butchers; 3=Processors/abattoirs; 4=Traders/brokers; 5=Farmers; 6=Fatteners; 
7=other (specify______________)] 
3.2. Do you have written contracts or verbal agreements with these customers/buyers? 
[1=yes; 2= no]__ 
3.2.1. If yes, specify with whom (use the same codes as above):________________________ 
3.2.2. If yes, what is the number of these customers/buyers you have a written contract/formal 
agreement with? ___________ 
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3.2.3. If yes, what is included in these purchasing contracts or verbal agreements? 
Arrangement 1=yes; 2= no Arrangement 1=yes; 2= no 
Time of purchase  Animal Health regime followed  
Price for purchase  Conditions and timing of payment  
Price/kg or 
price/animal 
 Supply of feed by the buyer  
Condition of animal  Supply of any other livestock services/inputs 
by buyer 
 
Weight of animal  Supply of any cropping services or inputs by 
buyer 
 
Age of animal  Agreement surrounding labour or wage  
Feeding regime 
followed 
 Exchange of any consumer goods  
Breeding  Transport of animals at any time during 
growth 
 
Transport of feed  Transport of animals at time of sale  
 
3.3. Indicate the number and type of cattle sold during last year 
Type of 
cattle 
(code a) 
Number Price (L/kg) Market 
channels (code 
b) 
Location 
(code c) 
Transportation 
mode (code d) 
Payment 
form (code 
e) 
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Codes 
Type of cattle 
(code a) 
Market channels 
(code b) 
Location 
(code c) 
Transportation 
mode 
(code d) 
Payment form 
(code e) 
1 = Weaners 
2 = 1-2 year old 
steers/ bulls 
3 = 3-5 year male 
cattle 
4 = Old cows 
5=Other (specify)     
1 = SMI 
2 = Butchers 
3 = 
processors/abattoir
s 
4 = 
Traders/brokers 
5= Farmers 
6= Cattle fatteners 
7 = Other (specify)     
1 = Farm gate 
2 = Dip-tanks 
3 = Livestock 
market 
4 = Buyer’s 
location 
5 = Fattening 
ranches auction 
sale 
6 = Other 
(specify)     
1 = Own 
transport 
2 = On foot 
3 = Public 
transport 
4 = Private 
transport 
5 = Buyers’ 
transport 
6 = Other 
(specify)     
1= cash on 
delivery 
2= cash in 
advance 
3= cash with 
delay 
4= part payment 
5= in kind on 
delivery 
6= in kind in 
advance 
7= in kind with 
delay 
8= Other 
(specify)     
4. Market information, extensions services and training 
4.1. Who provides with market information? (Tick as many) 
Government [   ]    Traders/brokers [   ]    Butchers [   ]   Farmers [   ]    TV/Radio [   ]   other 
[   ] ______ 
4.2. Which kind of market information are you looking for? (Tick as many) 
Prices [ ] Type of animals [ ] Type of buyers [ ]   Quality of animals [   ]    other [   ] ______ 
4.3. Have you participated in cattle production training during the last three years? [1=yes; 2= 
no]___ 
4.3.1. If no, why? ___________________________________________________________ 
4.3.2. If yes, filling the table below: 
Type of training Duration 
(days) 
Organiser 
Record keeping   
Beef cattle marketing   
Beef cattle health   
General farm management   
Pasture/rangeland establishment and 
Management 
  
Beef cattle feeding   
Other___________________________   
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4.4. Do you have a cattle extension officer operating in the area? [1=yes; 2= no]____ 
4.4.1. If yes, how many times/year does he visit your farm? (Code) ________ 
[1=Less than 3 times; 2=between 3 and 5 times; 3=between 6 and 10 times; 4=more than 10 
times] 
4.4.2. If yes, have the visits been helpful and how? [1=yes; 2= no]____ 
__________________________________________________________________________ 
4.5. Do you have a crop extension officer operating in the area? [1=yes; 2= no]____ 
4.5.1. If yes, how many times/year does he visit your farm? (Code) ________ 
[1=Less than 3 times; 2=between 3 and 5 times; 3=Between 6 and 10 times; 4=more than 10 
times] 
4.5.2. If yes, have the visits been helpful and how? [1=yes; 2= no]______________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
4.6. Please state the support provider and type of support provided 
Support 
provider 
Type of support 
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 
SDB           
NGOs           
SWADE           
MOA           
Microfinance I.           
Other________           
 
 
 
Codes 
1 = Training 
2 = Advisory services 
3 = Credit provision 
4 = Provision of all 
services 
5 = Provision of bull 
services  
6 = Veterinary services 
7 = Concentrated feed 
8 = Fodder seed 
9 = Breeding 
10 = Other (specify)     
5. Cattle fattening 
5.1. Are you/have you been involved in cattle fattening activities? [1=yes; 2= no]___ (if no 
go to question 5.5) 
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5.2. When have you started the cattle fattening activity? __________ 
5.3. Do you have feedlot premises? [1=yes; 2= no] _____ 
5.3.1 If yes, how many standing cattle? _____ 
5.4. During the last year (or last year before stopping the fattening activity), how many 
animals have you fattened and sold? ______ Animals 
5.5. What do you consider to be the best weight for starting to fatten a weaner/animal? ___kg 
5.6. What do you consider to be the best age for starting to fatten a weaner/animal? __months 
5.7. What could be approximately the market price of such weaner/animal? ______ Lilangeni 
5.8. What do you consider to be the best weight for selling fattened cattle? ____________kg 
5.9. Starting at your ideal weight, how long does it take you to achieve this weigh? ____days 
5.10. What could be approximately the selling price of such animal? ____________Lilangeni 
5.11. Would you consider working with cattle trader who will buy the animal to fatten on a 
contract scheme? [1=yes; 2= no]______ (if no go to section 6 on credits and loans) 
5.12. If the response is yes: 
5.12.1. How many animals would you do this with? __________ 
5.12.2. What type of animals (code)? ___________ 
[1=weaners; 2=1-2 year old steers or bulls; 3=3-5 year male cattle; 4=old cows;5=other 
(specify________________)] 
5.12.3. Would you be prepared to pay the costs of feed/animal health/transport? [1=yes; 2= 
no]_______ 
5.12.4. When the animal is sold, the amount of money already advanced to pay production 
costs would be deducted. From the amount left over, what share would you accept or 
what amount of money? ______% or      ______ Lilangeni 
5.12.5. Do you prefer to be paid on the basis of per Kg of weight gained or as a share of the 
final price? 
[1=per kg of weight gained; 2= share of the final price]_______ 
5.12.6. Which items would you want to monitor? 
5.12.6.1. Growth rate via weighing? [1=yes; 2= no]_______ 
5.12.6.2. Feed levels and type on hand? [1=yes; 2= no]_______ 
5.12.6.3. Feed levels and type actually being fed? [1=yes; 2= no]_______ 
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5.12.6.4. Animal health generally? [1=yes; 2= no]_______ 
5.12.6.5. Animal health interventions taken (e.g. vaccination or dipping)? [1=yes; 2= 
no]_______ 
5.12.7. Who is responsible if the animal dies within 1 month? __________________ 
5.12.8. Who is responsible if the animal dies after 1 month? ___________________ 
5.12.9. Who is responsible is the animal is stolen? ___________________________ 
5.12.10. If the fattening and sale activity is unsuccessful, are you willing to share in repaying 
the loan with the trader?[1=yes; 2= no]______________ 
5.12.10.1. If yes, how? (Code) _______ 
Codes 
1 = cash payment of an agreed amount 
2 = cash payment amounting to all the feed and input costs advanced 
3 = contribution of some % of other animals which you would be 
required to sell 
4 = provision of an animal to replace the one that died/other 
5 = Other (specify)________________________________________ 
5.12.11. If you had a contract for sale of animals, but another buyer offered you a better price 
or a better sales arrangement, what would you do (code)?______ 
Codes 
1 = stick with the contract 
2 = renegotiate the contract 
3 = buy other animals in addition to the ones under the contract 
4 = abandon the contract and just sell to the one offering the best 
price 
5=Other (specify) ________________________________________ 
6. Credits and loans 
6.1. Do you or have you borrowed money? [1=yes; 2= no]_______ 
6.1.1. If yes, from whom? (Tick as many) 
Friends/relatives [   ]      Cooperatives/associations [   ]         Banks [   ]    Microfinance 
institutions [ ] Traders [   ]    Farmers [   ]        Input providers [   ]     other [   ] __________ 
6.2. For your livestock and farming activities, have you received credits, loans or services 
from other stakeholders? ?[1=yes; 2= no]_______ (if yes please fill in the table) 
Type of credit or service 
(code a) 
From whom 
(code b) 
Frequency 
(code c) 
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Codes 
Type of credit or 
service 
(code a) 
From whom 
(code b) 
Frequency 
(code c) 
1 = Cash money in 
advance 
2 = Loan 
3 = In kind product 
4 = Veterinary 
service 
5= Other (specify) 
1 = Feed 
retailers 
2 = Beef 
trader 
3 = Farmer 
4 = SMI 
5= Butcher 
6= Cattle 
fatteners 
7 = Commercial 
bank 
8 = Microfinance 
institution 
9= Sugarcane 
company 
10 = Input provider 
11 = Other 
(specify) 
1 = Only once 
2 = Once a year 
3 = 2 times a year 
4 = Many times during the 
year 
5 = At the beginning of 
the season 
6 = Other (specify) 
6.3. Do you have a bank account? [1=yes; 2= no]_______ 
6.4. Have you ever received any loan facility from a bank or a financial institution? [1=yes; 
2= no]_______ 
6.4.1. If yes, specify the name of the institution/s: ___________________________________ 
6.5. Does your household own the following assets? 
Type of asset 
Does the Farmer 
own the asset? 
Y/N 
Number 
owned/area 
Current value 
Rental buildings [____]   
Permanent home [____]   
Land [____]   
Vehicles 
 [____]   
 [____]   
 [____]   
 [____]   
Other 
assets 
(specify) 
 [____]   
 [____]   
    
 [____]   
 [____]   
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APPENDIX B 
INNOVATIVE BEEF VALUE CHAIN DEVELOPMENT SCHEMES IN SOUTHERN 
AFRICA 
ILRI-IFAD-MOA 
Beef‎Traders’‎Survey 
1. Trader identification 
1.1. Name___________________________   1.2. Gender [1=male; 2=female]_______ 
1.3. Age__________________ 1.4. Educational Level ___________ 
[1= illiterate; 2=literate; 3=primary; 4=secondary; 
5=college; 6=university] 
1.5. Cell phone number: ________ 1.6. Year when you started working as cattle trader 
__________ 
1.7. Are you registered as a formal business? [1=yes; 2= no]_______ 
1.8.Is cattle trading your main business activity? [1=yes; 2= no]_______ 
1.9. What share of your income comes from cattle trading? _______% 
1.10. What share of your income come from cattle trading during the last year? _______% 
1.11. Is this share more than the previous year? [1=more; 2= equal; 3=less]_______ 
1.12. Are you involved in other business activities? [1=yes; 2= no]_______ 
1.12.1. If yes, specify: ________________________________________________________ 
1.13. Indicate the level of gross income per month that you make in the other business 
activity: code__  
[1= Less than E1 000; 2=E1 001 – E2 000; 3=E2 001 – E5 000; 4=Over E5 000] 
1.14. Which of the following business activities do you engage in (getting money from these 
activities)? (Tick as many) 
Livestock production [   ]  Livestock transport [   ]  Livestock 
fattening [   ]              Slaughtering [   ]    Meat processing [   ]    Meat retailing [   ] 
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Feed services [   ]  Breeding services [   ]  Credit services [   ] 
Buying to sell to Farmers (Brokers) [ ] Buying on Tender (response to an advert/ project) [   ] 
Veterinary and animal health services [   ] Cropping [   ] other (specify) 
[________________] 
1.15. Specify and rank the main type of livestock you are concerned with: (1
st
 = most 
important) 
1
st
 [_____]            2
nd
 [_____]            3
rd
 [_____]  [1=cattle; 2=pig; 3=sheep; 4=goats; 
5=poultry; 6=other (specify___)] 
1.16. Do you belong to an association or a formal group of traders/farmers? [1=yes; 2= 
no]_______ 
1.16.1. If yes, what’s the name of the association? _______________________ 
1.16.2. If yes, when have you joined the association? _______________________ 
1.16.3. What are the main benefits of joining it? ___________________________________ 
2. Cattle trading 
2.1. Main region/district of cattle trading activities:__________________________________ 
2.2. Specify and rank your main cattle suppliers? 
1
st
 [_____]             2
nd
 [_____]             3
rd
 [_____]  4
th
 [_____]  
[1=producers/farmers; 2=collectors/traders; 3=brokers; 4=other (specify________________)] 
2.3. Do you have written contracts or verbal agreements with some of these suppliers? 
[1=yes; 2= no]_______ (if no go to Q. 2.4) 
2.3.1. If yes, specify with whom (use the same codes as above):________________________ 
2.3.2. If yes, what number of these suppliers you have a contract with? __________ 
2.3.3. If yes, what is included in these purchasing contracts or arrangements? 
2.3.3.1. Time of purchase [1=yes; 2= no] ______ 
2.3.3.2. Price for purchase [1=yes; 2= no] ______ 2.3.3.3. Per kg or per animal? _________ 
2.3.3.4. Condition of animal [1=yes; 2= no] ______ 
2.3.3.5. Weight of animal [1=yes; 2= no] ______ 
2.3.3.6. Age of animal [1=yes; 2= no] ______ 
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2.3.3.7. Feeding regime followed [1=yes; 2= no] ______ 
2.3.3.8. Animal Health regime followed [1=yes; 2= no] ______ 
2.3.3.9. Breeding [1=yes; 2= no] _______ 
2.3.3.10. Conditions and timing of payment [1=yes; 2= no] _____  
2.3.3.11. If yes, specify conditions (code):_____ [1=advance payment; 2=always pay cash on 
a spot; 3=always pa supplier after sales; 4always pay suppliers after a time period 
of ……… weeks; 4=other (specify________________)] 
2.3.3.12. Supply of feed by you to the farmer [1=yes; 2= no] _______ 
2.3.3.13. Supply of any other livestock services or inputs by you [1=yes; 2= no] _______ 
2.3.3.14. Supply of any cropping services or inputs by you [1=yes; 2= no] _______ 
2.3.3.15. Any agreement surrounding labour or wages in connection with the livestock 
purchase? [1=yes; 2= no] ___ 
2.3.3.16. Exchange of any consumer goods [1=yes; 2= no] _______ 
2.3.3.17. Transport of feed [1=yes; 2= no] _______ 
2.3.3.18. Transport of animals at any time during growth [1=yes; 2= no] _______ 
2.3.3.19. Transport of animals at time of sale [1=yes; 2= no] _______ 
2.4. Indicate the number and type of cattle purchased during last year 
Type of 
cattle 
(code a) 
Number Reasons for 
purchase 
(code b) 
What changes in these 
numbers or purposes over the 
last few years? 
Main reasons for these 
changes (code c) 
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Codes 
Type of cattle (code a) Reasons for purchase (code b) Main reasons for these changes 
(code c) 
1 = Weaners 
2 = 1-2 year old steers or 
bulls 
3 = 3-5 year male cattle 
4 = Old cows 
5=Other (specify)     
1 = Fattening for later sale 
2 = Sale soon after purchase 
3 = Slaughtering and sale soon 
after purchase 
4 = To build up breeding stock 
5 = Other (specify)     
1 = Feed 
2 = Credit 
3 = Pricing issues 
4 = Market situation 
5 = International management 
issues 
6 = Other (specify)     
2.5. Specify and rank your main cattle customers/buyers? 
1
st
 [_____]             2
nd
 [_____]             3
rd
 [_____]  4
th
 [_____]  
[1=SMI; 2=supermarkets/hypermarkets; 3=butcheries; 4=processors/abattoirs; 5=traders; 
6=producers, 7=other (specify_____)] 
2.6. Do you have written contracts or verbal agreements with these customers/buyers? 
[1=yes; 2= no]_______ (if no go to Q. 2.7) 
2.6.1. If yes, specify with whom (use the same codes as above):_______________________ 
2.6.2. If yes, what’s the number of these customers/buyers you have a contract with? ______ 
2.7. Indicate the number and type of cattle purchased during last year 
Type of 
cattle 
(code a) 
Number Market channels 
(code b) 
Type of agreement 
(code c) 
Payment form 
(code d) 
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Codes 
Type of cattle 
(code a) 
Market channels 
(code b) 
Type of agreement 
(code c) 
Payment form 
(code d) 
1 = Weaners 
2 = 1-2 year old 
steers/ bulls 
3 = 3-5 year male 
cattle 
4 = Old cows 
5=Other (specify)     
1 = SMI 
2 = 
supermarket/hyperm
arket 
3 = butcheries 
4 = 
processors/abattoirs 
5 = Traders 
6= Producers 
7= Cattle fatteners 
8 = Other (specify)     
1 = Written contract 
2 = Verbal agreement 
1= cash on delivery 
2= cash in advance 
3= cash with delay 
4= part payment 
5= in kind on 
delivery 
6= in kind in advance 
7= in kind with delay 
8= Other (specify)     
3. Cattle fattening 
3.1. What do you consider to be the best weight for buying a weaner to fatten? _________kg 
3.2. What do you consider to be the best age for buying a weaner to fatten? ________months 
3.3. What could be approximately the buying price of such animal? ____________Lilangeni 
3.4. What do you consider to be the best weight for selling fattened cattle? ____________kg 
3.5. How long does it take to achieve this weight? ____________________days 
3.6. What could be approximately the selling price of such animal? ____________ Lilangeni 
3.7. Do you buy weaners to fatten then sell? [1=yes; 2= no]____ 
3.8. Would you consider working with cattle on a contract scheme? [1=yes; 2= no]_______ 
(if no go to Q. 4.1) 
3.9. If the response is yes: 
3.9.1. How many animals would you do this with? __________ 
3.9.2. What type of animals (code)? ___________ 
[1=weaners; 2=1-2 year old steers or bulls; 3=3-5 year male cattle; 4=old cows; 5=other 
(specify________________)] 
3.9.3. Would you be prepared to pay the costs of feed/animal health/transport? [1=yes; 2= 
no]_______ 
3.9.3.1. If yes, would you pay this in advance? [1=yes; 2= no]_______ 
3.9.3.2. If yes, would you provide the feed and the inputs yourself or give the farmer the cash 
(code)? [1=provide the feed and the inputs; 2= give the farmer the cash]_______ 
107 
 
3.9.4. What share of the sales price of the animal would then go to the producer, minus any 
costs already paid? ______% 
3.9.5. Would you pay the farmer per Kg of weight gained or as a share of the final price? 
[1=per kg of weight gained; 2= share of the final price]_______ 
3.9.6. Which items would you want to monitor? 
3.9.6.1. Growth rate via weighing? [1=yes; 2= no]_______ 
3.9.6.2. Feed levels and type on hand? [1=yes; 2= no]_______ 
3.9.6.3. Feed levels and type actually being fed? [1=yes; 2= no]_______ 
3.9.6.4. Animal health generally? [1=yes; 2= no]_______ 
3.9.6.5. Animal health interventions taken (e.g. vaccination or dipping)? [1=yes; 2= 
no]_______ 
3.10. Who is responsible if the animal dies within 1 month? __________________ 
3.11. Who is responsible if the animal dies after 1 month? ___________________ 
3.12. Who is responsible is the animal is stolen? ___________________________ 
3.13. If the fattening and sale activity is unsuccessful, how would you want the farmer to 
share in repaying the loan code)? _______ 
Codes 
1 = cash payment of an agreed amount 
2 = cash payment amounting to all the feed and input costs advanced 
3 = contribution of some % of other animals which the fattener would 
be required to sell 
4 = provision of an animal to replace the one that died/other 
5=Other (specify)_________________________________________ 
3.14. What would you do if feed ran out, such as in a drought? 
_______________________________ 
3.15. What would you do if the period of loan expired and the animal was not ready for 
slaughter? _________________________________________________________________ 
3.16. What would you do if the farmer was doing a good job but the animal was simply not 
growing fast enough? ________________________________________________________ 
3.17. If you had a contract for purchase of animals, but better or cheaper animals became 
available, what would you do (code)? _____ 
Codes 
1 = stick with the contract 
2 = renegotiate the contract 
3 = buy the cheaper animals in addition to the ones under the contract 
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4 = abandon the contract and just buy the cheaper animals 
5=Other (specify)_________________________________________ 
3.18. If you had a contract for sale of animals, but another buyer offered you a better price or 
a better sales arrangement, what would you do (code)? _____ 
Codes 
1 = stick with the contract 
2 = renegotiate the contract 
3 = buy other animals in addition to the ones under the contract 
4 = abandon the contract and just sell to the one offering the best 
price 
5=Other (specify)_________________________________________ 
3.19. If you had a contract that were in general happy with and confident that it would work, 
what interest rate would you be prepared to pay for a loan to buy the animal and a set of 
inputs?_________% 
3.20. If you had a contract that were in general happy with and confident that it would work, 
what amount of money would borrow if the interest rate is 25 %?_______________ 
4. Credits and loans 
4.1.  Do you have a bank account? [1=yes; 2= no]_______ 
4.2. If yes, please fill in: 
Type of account 
(code a) 
Name of the bank Active? 
[1=yes; 2= no] 
   
   
   
Code a: [1=savings; 2=cheque; 3=investment; 4=transmission; 5=other (specify__________)] 
4.3. Have you ever received any loan facility from a bank or a financial institution?[1=yes; 
2= no]_______ 
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4.4. If yes, please fill in this table: 
Name of the 
financial 
institution 
Name of 
financial 
product 
Date Loan 
requirement
s 
(code a) 
Purpose 
(code b) 
Amount 
in 
Lilangeni 
Repayment 
Period 
(months) 
Loan 
paid 
back? 
(code c) 
If 
partially 
or not at 
all, 
why? 
         
         
         
         
 
Codes 
Loan requirements (code a) Purpose (code b) Loan paid back (code c) 
1 = Financial statements 
2 = Pay-slip or proof of 
income 
3 = Deposit as collateral 
4=Fixed assets as collateral 
5=Other (Specify)     
1 = Cattle trading 
2 = Other agricultural 
purposes 
3 = Non-agricultural 
purposes 
1 = Yes, totally 
2 = Partially 
3 = Not at all 
4.5. Do you prefer to get an individual loan from a bank/financial institution or a loan that is 
allocated to an association of beef traders and then you’ll get the loan from the association? 
[1=individual loan; 2=from the association] 
4.5.1. Why: 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
___________________________________________________________________________ 
4.6. Does your household own the following assets? 
Type of asset 
Does the trader 
own the asset? 
Y/N 
Number 
owned/area 
Current value 
Rental buildings [____]   
Permanent home [____]   
Plots [____]   
Vehicles [____]   
Other assets (specify) [____]   
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5. Risk assessment 
5.1. Which of the following would you choose: (tick only one) 
 <[List Paragraph1]>A payment of $100 that you were 100 % sure to get? 
 <[List Paragraph1]>A coin flips with $200 for your choice of heads and $0 for tails? 
 <[List Paragraph1]>A dice role with $600 for your choice of “6” and $0 for any other 
result? 
5.2. Fill the following table in terms of main sources of risks? 
Source of risk Intensity 
(code a) 
How often the risk is 
faced (code b) 
How do you 
manage the risk 
(code c) 
Price fluctuation    
Animal losses    
Grade 
uncertainty 
   
Feed availability    
Animal health     
 
Codes 
Intensity (code a) How often (code b) Manage the risk (code c) 
1 = Very high 
2 = High 
3 = Normal 
4= Low 
1 = Very often 
2 = Often 
3 = Not often 
4 = Rare 
1 = Insurance 
2 = buying/selling 
contracts/agreements 
3 = check-off services 
4= other (specify) 
5.3. Do you consider yourself a risk taker? [1=yes; 2= no]_______ 
 
 
 
 
 
